CISA has added two new vulnerabilities to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) Catalog, based on evidence of active exploitation.
\nThese types of vulnerabilities are a frequent attack vector for malicious cyber actors and pose significant risks to the federal enterprise.
\nBinding Operational Directive (BOD) 26-04: Prioritizing Security Updates Based on Risk establishes vulnerability management requirements for Federal Civilian Executive Branch (FCEB) agencies, updating BOD 22-01. BOD 26-04 reinforces the importance of the KEV catalog and requires federal agencies to prioritize rapid remediation of high-risk vulnerabilities, specifically those identified by Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVEs) listed in CISA\u2019s Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog on publicly exposed assets that grant total control of the asset post-exploitation, while deferring action for lower-risk vulnerabilities. BOD 26-04 further establishes basic expectations for when agencies must check whether threat actors compromised the system before the patch was applied.
\nWhile BOD 26-04 applies only to FCEB agencies, CISA encourages all organizations to adopt risk-based vulnerability management and prioritize remediation of KEV catalog vulnerabilities. CISA will continue to add vulnerabilities to the catalog that meet the specified criteria.
\nAware of an exploited vulnerability not currently listed in the KEV catalog? Submit for potential addition: KEV Nomination Form. Potential KEV additions must have a CVE ID, evidence of exploitation, and clear mitigation guidance.
", "summary_is_html": true, "first_seen": "Mon, 15 Jun 26 12:00:00 +0000", "last_updated": "Mon, 15 Jun 26 12:00:00 +0000" }, { "id": "https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/alerts/2026/06/12/cisa-adds-one-known-exploited-vulnerability-catalog", "title": "CISA Adds One Known Exploited Vulnerability to Catalog", "source": "CISA Cybersecurity Advisory", "source_url": "https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/alerts/2026/06/12/cisa-adds-one-known-exploited-vulnerability-catalog", "summary": "CISA has added one new vulnerability to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) Catalog, based on evidence of active exploitation.
\nThis type of vulnerability is a frequent attack vector for malicious cyber actors and poses significant risks to the federal enterprise.
\nBinding Operational Directive (BOD) 26-04: Prioritizing Security Updates Based on Risk establishes vulnerability management requirements for Federal Civilian Executive Branch (FCEB) agencies, updating BOD 22-01. BOD 26-04 reinforces the importance of the KEV catalog and requires federal agencies to prioritize rapid remediation of high-risk vulnerabilities, specifically those identified by Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVEs) listed in CISA\u2019s Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog on publicly exposed assets that grant total control of the asset post-exploitation, while deferring action for lower-risk vulnerabilities. BOD 26-04 further establishes basic expectations for when agencies must check whether threat actors compromised the system before the patch was applied.
\nWhile BOD 26-04 applies only to FCEB agencies, CISA encourages all organizations to adopt risk-based vulnerability management and prioritize remediation of KEV catalog vulnerabilities. CISA will continue to add vulnerabilities to the catalog that meet the specified criteria.
\nAware of an exploited vulnerability not currently listed in the KEV catalog? Submit for potential addition: KEV Nomination Form. Potential KEV additions must have a CVE ID, evidence of exploitation, and clear mitigation guidance.
", "summary_is_html": true, "first_seen": "Fri, 12 Jun 26 12:00:00 +0000", "last_updated": "Fri, 12 Jun 26 12:00:00 +0000" }, { "id": "https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/ics-advisories/icsa-26-162-01", "title": "Yarbo Android/iOS Mobile Application and Cloud Infrastructure", "source": "CISA Cybersecurity Advisory", "source_url": "https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/ics-advisories/icsa-26-162-01", "summary": "\nSuccessful exploitation of these vulnerabilities could allow an attacker to obtain hard-coded credentials, gain access to telemetry data, and potentially send operational commands to the robot fleet.
\nThe following versions of Yarbo Android/iOS Mobile Application and Cloud Infrastructure are affected:
\n| CVSS | \nVendor | \nEquipment | \nVulnerabilities | \n
|---|---|---|---|
| v3 9.8 | \nYarbo | \nYarbo Android/iOS Mobile Application and Cloud Infrastructure | \nUse of Hard-coded Credentials, Missing Authorization | \n
The Yarbo Android and iOS applications contain hard-coded MQTT broker credentials that are identical for all users and all devices. These credentials are embedded in the application binary and are readily extractable via APK decompilation. The credentials provide access to cloud MQTT brokers carrying real-time telemetry for the entire global Yarbo robot fleet. They allow both wildcard subscription to all robot telemetry topics and publishing to any robot's command topic using only the robot's serial number..
\n\nMitigation
Yarbo recommends users update the Yarbo mobile app to 3.17.4 or later. Server-side broker authorization will be enforced automatically upon deployment of the May 2026 update. No user action is required.
Relevant CWE: CWE-798 Use of Hard-coded Credentials
\n| CVSS Version | \nBase Score | \nBase Severity | \nVector String | \n
|---|---|---|---|
| 3.1 | \n9.8 | \nCRITICAL | \nCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | \n
| 4.0 | \n9.3 | \nCRITICAL | \nCVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N | \n
The Yarbo cloud does not enforce per-device or per-user authorization. Any client possessing valid credentials, whether the shared hard-coded credentials or legitimate per-user credentials, can subscribe to wildcard topics covering all robots globally, and can publish to any robot's command topic using only the robot's serial number (disclosed in the telemetry stream). Even after removal of hard-coded credentials from the app, a single compromised credential could still provide fleet-wide access without per-device access controls.
\n\nMitigation
Yarbo recommends users update the Yarbo mobile app to 3.17.4 or later. Server-side broker authorization will be enforced automatically upon deployment of the May 2026 update. No user action is required.
Relevant CWE: CWE-862 Missing Authorization
\n| CVSS Version | \nBase Score | \nBase Severity | \nVector String | \n
|---|---|---|---|
| 3.1 | \n8.1 | \nHIGH | \nCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N | \n
| 4.0 | \n8.6 | \nHIGH | \nCVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N | \n
This product is provided subject to this Notification (https://www.cisa.gov/notification) and this Privacy & Use policy (https://www.cisa.gov/privacy-policy).
\nCISA recommends users take defensive measures to minimize the risk of exploitation of this these vulnerabilities.
\nMinimize network exposure for all control system devices and/or systems, ensuring they are not accessible from the internet.
\nLocate control system networks and remote devices behind firewalls and isolating them from business networks.
\nWhen remote access is required, use more secure methods, such as Virtual Private Networks (VPNs), recognizing VPNs may have vulnerabilities and should be updated to the most current version available. Also recognize VPN is only as secure as the connected devices.
\nCISA reminds organizations to perform proper impact analysis and risk assessment prior to deploying defensive measures.
\nCISA also provides a section for control systems security recommended practices on the ICS webpage on cisa.gov/ics. Several CISA products detailing cyber defense best practices are available for reading and download, including Improving Industrial Control Systems Cybersecurity with Defense-in-Depth Strategies.
\nCISA encourages organizations to implement recommended cybersecurity strategies for proactive defense of ICS assets.
\nAdditional mitigation guidance and recommended practices are publicly available on the ICS webpage at cisa.gov/ics in the technical information paper, ICS-TIP-12-146-01B--Targeted Cyber Intrusion Detection and Mitigation Strategies.
\nOrganizations observing suspected malicious activity should follow established internal procedures and report findings to CISA for tracking and correlation against other incidents.
\nCISA also recommends users take the following measures to protect themselves from social engineering attacks:
\nDo not click web links or open attachments in unsolicited email messages.
\nRefer to Recognizing and Avoiding Email Scams for more information on avoiding email scams.
\nRefer to Avoiding Social Engineering and Phishing Attacks for more information on social engineering attacks.
\nNo known public exploitation specifically targeting these vulnerabilities has been reported to CISA at this time.
\n| Date | \nRevision | \nSummary | \n
|---|---|---|
| 2026-06-11 | \n1 | \nInitial Publication | \n
Successful exploitation of these vulnerabilities could allow an attacker to impersonate devices, intercept or manipulate communications, harvest sensitive credentials at scale, or gain unauthorized access.
\nThe following versions of Naxclow IoT Platform are affected:
\n| CVSS | \nVendor | \nEquipment | \nVulnerabilities | \n
|---|---|---|---|
| v3 9.8 | \nNaxclow | \nNaxclow IoT Platform | \nAuthorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key, Missing Authorization, Not Using Password Aging, Use of Hard-coded Cryptographic Key, Generation of Predictable Numbers or Identifiers, Insertion of Sensitive Information into Externally-Accessible File or Directory | \n
A flaw in Naxclow's platform's onboarding workflow allows an attacker to replay a confirm-then-bind sequence to silently reassign a device to an arbitrary account. Because the affected endpoints validate request signatures but do not confirm legitimate ownership, an attacker with any account can take over a device without user interaction while the device remains online and unaware.
\n\nMitigation
Naxclow did not respond to CISA's attempts to coordinate these vulnerabilities. Users should contact Naxclow for more information.
Relevant CWE: CWE-639 Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key
\n| CVSS Version | \nBase Score | \nBase Severity | \nVector String | \n
|---|---|---|---|
| 3.1 | \n8.8 | \nHIGH | \nCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | \n
| 4.0 | \n8.7 | \nHIGH | \nCVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N | \n
The Naxclow platform API that returns device relay registration details exposes a persistent credential without verifying that the requester is the legitimate device or owner. An actor able to present a platform-valid request signature can retrieve credentials for arbitrary devices and register on the relay as that device, enabling interception and disruption of its communications.
\n\nMitigation
Naxclow did not respond to CISA's attempts to coordinate these vulnerabilities. Users should contact Naxclow for more information.
Relevant CWE: CWE-862 Missing Authorization
\n| CVSS Version | \nBase Score | \nBase Severity | \nVector String | \n
|---|---|---|---|
| 3.1 | \n7.5 | \nHIGH | \nCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N | \n
| 4.0 | \n8.7 | \nHIGH | \nCVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N | \n
Naxclow devices use a server-side, per-device relay credential that never rotates and is re-issued to the device on each boot. Because this credential remains valid indefinitely and cannot be reset or revoked by the legitimate owner, any party that obtains it through any exposure path can maintain persistent access to the device's relay channel. This enables long-term impersonation or interception, even after factory resets or re-onboarding.
\n\nMitigation
Naxclow did not respond to CISA's attempts to coordinate these vulnerabilities. Users should contact Naxclow for more information.
Relevant CWE: CWE-262 Not Using Password Aging
\n| CVSS Version | \nBase Score | \nBase Severity | \nVector String | \n
|---|---|---|---|
| 3.1 | \n8.1 | \nHIGH | \nCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | \n
| 4.0 | \n9.2 | \nCRITICAL | \nCVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N | \n
Naxclow devices use a uniform request-signing scheme based on a hard-coded, platform-wide salt embedded in every firmware image. Once this salt is recovered from any device, an attacker can generate valid signatures for arbitrary device or account operations due to the absence of per-device keys, server-side nonce tracking, or replay protections. Combined with the system's use of plain HTTP for control-plane traffic, the construction enables broad request forgery and impersonation across the platform.
\n\nMitigation
Naxclow did not respond to CISA's attempts to coordinate these vulnerabilities. Users should contact Naxclow for more information.
Relevant CWE: CWE-321 Use of Hard-coded Cryptographic Key
\n| CVSS Version | \nBase Score | \nBase Severity | \nVector String | \n
|---|---|---|---|
| 3.1 | \n9.8 | \nCRITICAL | \nCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | \n
| 4.0 | \n9.2 | \nCRITICAL | \nCVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N | \n
Naxclow device identifiers use fixed manufacturing prefixes combined with sequential counters, producing a fully predictable and enumerable identifier space. Because the platform also exposes an endpoint that reveals the current identifier high-water mark, the active fleet can be enumerated.
\n\nMitigation
Naxclow did not respond to CISA's attempts to coordinate these vulnerabilities. Users should contact Naxclow for more information.
Relevant CWE: CWE-340 Generation of Predictable Numbers or Identifiers
\n| CVSS Version | \nBase Score | \nBase Severity | \nVector String | \n
|---|---|---|---|
| 3.1 | \n5.3 | \nMEDIUM | \nCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N | \n
| 4.0 | \n6.9 | \nMEDIUM | \nCVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N | \n
The Naxclow platform exposes a registration endpoint that accepts signed requests containing a batch prefix and an arbitrary caller-supplied account identifier, without validating any ownership relationship. Each call mints a new sequential device identifier and returns the current high-water counter value for the batch, allowing callers to measure and enumerate the active device space. The endpoint's behavior enables precise fleet enumeration.
\n\nMitigation
Naxclow did not respond to CISA's attempts to coordinate these vulnerabilities. Users should contact Naxclow for more information.
Relevant CWE: CWE-862 Missing Authorization
\n| CVSS Version | \nBase Score | \nBase Severity | \nVector String | \n
|---|---|---|---|
| 3.1 | \n5.3 | \nMEDIUM | \nCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N | \n
| 4.0 | \n6.9 | \nMEDIUM | \nCVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N | \n
During WiFi association, Naxclow device firmware prints the host network's SSID, PSK, and negotiated WPA keys in cleartext to an exposed UART console on production hardware. The UART pads are labeled, run with default serial settings, and drop to an interactive RT-Thread shell that permits arbitrary memory reads, enabling full firmware extraction. An attacker with brief physical access, common for outdoor-mounted devices, can therefore recover WiFi credentials and bootstrap firmware-side attacks.
\n\nMitigation
Naxclow did not respond to CISA's attempts to coordinate these vulnerabilities. Users should contact Naxclow for more information.
Relevant CWE: CWE-538 Insertion of Sensitive Information into Externally-Accessible File or Directory
\n| CVSS Version | \nBase Score | \nBase Severity | \nVector String | \n
|---|---|---|---|
| 3.1 | \n4.6 | \nMEDIUM | \nCVSS:3.1/AV:P/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N | \n
| 4.0 | \n5.1 | \nMEDIUM | \nCVSS:4.0/AV:P/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N | \n
This product is provided subject to this Notification (https://www.cisa.gov/notification) and this Privacy & Use policy (https://www.cisa.gov/privacy-policy).
\nCISA recommends users take defensive measures to minimize the risk of exploitation of these vulnerabilities.
\nMinimize network exposure for all control system devices and/or systems, ensuring they are not accessible from the internet.
\nLocate control system networks and remote devices behind firewalls and isolating them from business networks.
\nWhen remote access is required, use more secure methods, such as Virtual Private Networks (VPNs), recognizing VPNs may have vulnerabilities and should be updated to the most current version available. Also recognize VPN is only as secure as the connected devices.
\nCISA reminds organizations to perform proper impact analysis and risk assessment prior to deploying defensive measures.
\nCISA also provides a section for control systems security recommended practices on the ICS webpage on cisa.gov/ics. Several CISA products detailing cyber defense best practices are available for reading and download, including Improving Industrial Control Systems Cybersecurity with Defense-in-Depth Strategies.
\nCISA encourages organizations to implement recommended cybersecurity strategies for proactive defense of ICS assets.
\nAdditional mitigation guidance and recommended practices are publicly available on the ICS webpage at cisa.gov/ics in the technical information paper, ICS-TIP-12-146-01B--Targeted Cyber Intrusion Detection and Mitigation Strategies.
\nOrganizations observing suspected malicious activity should follow established internal procedures and report findings to CISA for tracking and correlation against other incidents.
\nCISA also recommends users take the following measures to protect themselves from social engineering attacks:
\nDo not click web links or open attachments in unsolicited email messages.
\nRefer to Recognizing and Avoiding Email Scams for more information on avoiding email scams.
\nRefer to Avoiding Social Engineering and Phishing Attacks for more information on social engineering attacks.
\nNo known public exploitation specifically targeting these vulnerabilities has been reported to CISA at this time.
\n| Date | \nRevision | \nSummary | \n
|---|---|---|
| 2026-06-11 | \n1 | \nInitial Publication | \n
Successful exploitation of these vulnerabilities could allow a remote unauthenticated attacker to gain unauthorized access to live video feeds, retrieve sensitive visual information from affected premises, and obtain administrative control of the device.
\nThe following versions of Brickcom Cameras are affected:
\n| CVSS | \nVendor | \nEquipment | \nVulnerabilities | \n
|---|---|---|---|
| v3 7.7 | \nBrickcom | \nBrickcom Cameras | \nMissing Authentication for Critical Function, Use of Default Credentials | \n
The affected product allows unauthenticated access to live snapshot images via the /ONVIF endpoint and no authentication is required to retrieve still images from the camera feed.
\n\nMitigation
Brickcom did not respond to CISAs request for coordination. Users are encouraged to reach out to Brickcom for support https://www.brickcom.com/case/
https://www.brickcom.com/case/
Relevant CWE: CWE-306 Missing Authentication for Critical Function
\n| CVSS Version | \nBase Score | \nBase Severity | \nVector String | \n
|---|---|---|---|
| 3.1 | \n7.7 | \nHIGH | \nCVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N | \n
| 4.0 | \n8.3 | \nHIGH | \nCVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:N | \n
The affected product ships with default credentials that allows any unauthenticated remote attacker to silently access camera feeds.
\n\nMitigation
Brickcom did not respond to CISAs request for coordination. Users are encouraged to reach out to Brickcom for support https://www.brickcom.com/case/
https://www.brickcom.com/case/
Relevant CWE: CWE-1392 Use of Default Credentials
\n| CVSS Version | \nBase Score | \nBase Severity | \nVector String | \n
|---|---|---|---|
| 3.1 | \n7.7 | \nHIGH | \nCVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N | \n
| 4.0 | \n8.3 | \nHIGH | \nCVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:N | \n
This product is provided subject to this Notification (https://www.cisa.gov/notification) and this Privacy & Use policy (https://www.cisa.gov/privacy-policy).
\nCISA recommends users take defensive measures to minimize the risk of exploitation of these vulnerabilities.
\nMinimize network exposure for all control system devices and/or systems, ensuring they are not accessible from the internet.
\nLocate control system networks and remote devices behind firewalls and isolating them from business networks.
\nWhen remote access is required, use more secure methods, such as Virtual Private Networks (VPNs), recognizing VPNs may have vulnerabilities and should be updated to the most current version available. Also recognize VPN is only as secure as the connected devices.
\nCISA reminds organizations to perform proper impact analysis and risk assessment prior to deploying defensive measures.
\nCISA also provides a section for control systems security recommended practices on the ICS webpage on cisa.gov/ics. Several CISA products detailing cyber defense best practices are available for reading and download, including Improving Industrial Control Systems Cybersecurity with Defense-in-Depth Strategies.
\nCISA encourages organizations to implement recommended cybersecurity strategies for proactive defense of ICS assets.
\nAdditional mitigation guidance and recommended practices are publicly available on the ICS webpage at cisa.gov/ics in the technical information paper, ICS-TIP-12-146-01B--Targeted Cyber Intrusion Detection and Mitigation Strategies.
\nOrganizations observing suspected malicious activity should follow established internal procedures and report findings to CISA for tracking and correlation against other incidents.
\nCISA also recommends users take the following measures to protect themselves from social engineering attacks:
\nDo not click web links or open attachments in unsolicited email messages.
\nRefer to Recognizing and Avoiding Email Scams for more information on avoiding email scams.
\nRefer to Avoiding Social Engineering and Phishing Attacks for more information on social engineering attacks.
\nNo known public exploitation specifically targeting these vulnerabilities has been reported to CISA at this time. These vulnerabilities are not exploitable remotely.
\n| Date | \nRevision | \nSummary | \n
|---|---|---|
| 2026-06-11 | \n1 | \nInitial Publication | \n
CISA has added one new vulnerability to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) Catalog, based on evidence of active exploitation.
\nThis type of vulnerability is a frequent attack vector for malicious cyber actors and poses significant risks to the federal enterprise.
\nBinding Operational Directive (BOD) 26-04: Prioritizing Security Updates Based on Risk establishes vulnerability management requirements for Federal Civilian Executive Branch (FCEB) agencies, updating BOD 22-01. BOD 26-04 reinforces the importance of the KEV catalog and requires federal agencies to prioritize rapid remediation of high-risk vulnerabilities, specifically those identified by Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVEs) listed in CISA\u2019s Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog on publicly exposed assets that grant total control of the asset post-exploitation, while deferring action for lower-risk vulnerabilities. BOD 26-04 further establishes basic expectations for when agencies must check whether threat actors compromised the system before the patch was applied.
\nWhile BOD 26-04 applies only to FCEB agencies, CISA encourages all organizations to adopt risk-based vulnerability management and prioritize remediation of KEV catalog vulnerabilities. CISA will continue to add vulnerabilities to the catalog that meet the specified criteria.
\nAware of an exploited vulnerability not currently listed in the KEV catalog? Submit for potential addition: KEV Nomination Form. Potential KEV additions must have a CVE ID, evidence of exploitation, and clear mitigation guidance.
", "summary_is_html": true, "first_seen": "Thu, 11 Jun 26 12:00:00 +0000", "last_updated": "Thu, 11 Jun 26 12:00:00 +0000" }, { "id": "https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/alerts/2026/06/09/cisa-adds-three-known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog", "title": "CISA Adds Three Known Exploited Vulnerabilities to Catalog", "source": "CISA Cybersecurity Advisory", "source_url": "https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/alerts/2026/06/09/cisa-adds-three-known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog", "summary": "CISA has added three new vulnerabilities to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) Catalog, based on evidence of active exploitation.
\nThese types of vulnerabilities are a frequent attack vector for malicious cyber actors and pose significant risks to the federal enterprise.
\nBinding Operational Directive (BOD) 22-01: Reducing the Significant Risk of Known Exploited Vulnerabilities established the KEV Catalog as a living list of known Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVEs) that carry significant risk to the federal enterprise. BOD 22-01 requires Federal Civilian Executive Branch (FCEB) agencies to remediate identified vulnerabilities by the due date to protect FCEB networks against active threats. See the BOD 22-01 Fact Sheet for more information.
\nAlthough BOD 22-01 only applies to FCEB agencies, CISA strongly urges all organizations to reduce their exposure to cyberattacks by prioritizing timely remediation of KEV Catalog vulnerabilities as part of their vulnerability management practice. CISA will continue to add vulnerabilities to the catalog that meet the specified criteria.
", "summary_is_html": true, "first_seen": "Tue, 09 Jun 26 12:00:00 +0000", "last_updated": "Tue, 09 Jun 26 12:00:00 +0000" }, { "id": "https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/ics-advisories/icsa-26-160-02", "title": "Siemens KACO Blueplanet Inverters", "source": "CISA Cybersecurity Advisory", "source_url": "https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/ics-advisories/icsa-26-160-02", "summary": "\nKACO blueplanet Inverters contain multiple vulnerabilities that could allow an attacker to derive the credentials from the devices serial number and misuse them to gain unauthorized access. KACO new energy GmbH has released new versions for several affected products and recommends to update to the latest versions. KACO new energy GmbH is preparing further fix versions and recommends countermeasures for products where fixes are not, or not yet available.
\nThe following versions of Siemens KACO Blueplanet Inverters are affected:
\n| CVSS | \nVendor | \nEquipment | \nVulnerabilities | \n
|---|---|---|---|
| v3 8.3 | \nSiemens | \nSiemens KACO Blueplanet Inverters | \nUse of Hard-coded Cryptographic Key, Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection') | \n
A CRC16-based algorithm for generating Technical Service credentials could allow an attacker to derive the credentials from the devices serial number and misuse them to gain unauthorized access.
\n\nNo fix planned
Currently no fix is planned
None available
Currently no fix is available
Vendor fix
Update to V3.91 or later version
https://kaco-newenergy.com/service/mykacocom-customer-portal
Vendor fix
Update to V6.1.4.9 or later version
https://kaco-newenergy.com/service/mykacocom-customer-portal
Relevant CWE: CWE-321 Use of Hard-coded Cryptographic Key
\n| CVSS Version | \nBase Score | \nBase Severity | \nVector String | \n
|---|---|---|---|
| 3.1 | \n8.3 | \nHIGH | \nCVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:H | \n
Improper neutralization of special elements used in an sql command ('sql injection') in KACO Meteor server allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges over a local network.
\n\nNone available
Currently no fix is available
Relevant CWE: CWE-89 Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection')
\n| CVSS Version | \nBase Score | \nBase Severity | \nVector String | \n
|---|---|---|---|
| 3.1 | \n6 | \nMEDIUM | \nCVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:H | \n
Operators of critical power systems (e.g. TSOs or DSOs) worldwide are usually required by regulations to build resilience into the power grids by applying multi-level redundant secondary protection schemes. It is therefore recommended that the operators check whether appropriate resilient protection measures are in place. The risk of cyber incidents impacting the grid's reliability can thus be minimized by virtue of the grid design. Siemens strongly recommends applying the provided security updates using the corresponding tooling and documented procedures made available with the product. If supported by the product, an automated means to apply the security updates across multiple product instances may be used. Siemens strongly recommends prior validation of any security update before being applied, and supervision by trained staff of the update process in the target environment. As a general security measure Siemens strongly recommends to protect network access with appropriate mechanisms (e.g. firewalls, segmentation, VPN). It is advised to configure the environment according to our operational guidelines in order to run the devices in a protected IT environment. Recommended security guidelines can be found at: https://www.siemens.com/gridsecurity
\nFor further inquiries on security vulnerabilities in Siemens products and solutions, please contact the Siemens ProductCERT: https://www.siemens.com/cert/advisories
\nThe use of Siemens Security Advisories is subject to the terms and conditions listed on: https://www.siemens.com/productcert/terms-of-use.
\nThis product is provided subject to this Notification (https://www.cisa.gov/notification) and this Privacy & Use policy (https://www.cisa.gov/privacy-policy).
\nCISA recommends users take defensive measures to minimize the exploitation risk of this vulnerability.
\nMinimize network exposure for all control system devices and/or systems, and ensure they are not accessible from the internet.
\nLocate control system networks and remote devices behind firewalls and isolate them from business networks.
\nWhen remote access is required, use more secure methods, such as Virtual Private Networks (VPNs), recognizing VPNs may have vulnerabilities and should be updated to the most recent version available. Also recognize VPN is only as secure as its connected devices.
\nCISA reminds organizations to perform proper impact analysis and risk assessment prior to deploying defensive measures.
\nCISA also provides a section for control systems security recommended practices on the ICS webpage on cisa.gov. Several CISA products detailing cyber defense best practices are available for reading and download, including Improving Industrial Control Systems Cybersecurity with Defense-in-Depth Strategies.
\nCISA encourages organizations to implement recommended cybersecurity strategies for proactive defense of ICS assets. Additional mitigation guidance and recommended practices are publicly available on the ICS webpage at cisa.gov in the technical information paper, ICS-TIP-12-146-01B--Targeted Cyber Intrusion Detection and Mitigation Strategies.
\nOrganizations observing suspected malicious activity should follow established internal procedures and report findings to CISA for tracking and correlation against other incidents.
\nThis ICSA is a verbatim republication of Siemens ProductCERT SSA-545643 from a direct conversion of the vendor's Common Security Advisory Framework (CSAF) advisory. This is republished to CISA's website as a means of increasing visibility and is provided \"as-is\" for informational purposes only. CISA is not responsible for the editorial or technical accuracy of republished advisories and provides no warranties of any kind regarding any information contained within this advisory. Further, CISA does not endorse any commercial product or service. Please contact Siemens ProductCERT directly for any questions regarding this advisory.
\n| Date | \nRevision | \nSummary | \n
|---|---|---|
| 2026-05-12 | \n1 | \nPublication Date | \n
| 2026-06-09 | \n2 | \nInitial CISA Republication of Siemens ProductCERT SSA-545643 advisory | \n
Schneider Electric is aware of its vulnerability in its EcoStruxure Panel Server offer. The EcoStruxure Panel Server is a high performance, modular gateway with enhanced cybersecurity that provides easy and fast connections to multiple concurrent edge control or cloud applications. Failure to apply the remediations provided below may risk unauthorized authentication, which could lead to access to sensitive information.
\nThe following versions of Schneider Electric EcoStruxure Panel Server are affected:
\n| CVSS | \nVendor | \nEquipment | \nVulnerabilities | \n
|---|---|---|---|
| v3 7.5 | \nSchneider Electric | \nSchneider Electric EcoStruxure Panel Server | \nInitialization of a Resource with an Insecure Default | \n
CWE-1188 Initialization of a Resource with an Insecure Default vulnerability exists that could cause unauthorized disclosure of sensitive information when credentials revert to initial settings in rare circumstances, enabling unauthorized authentication using known credentials
\n\nVendor fix
Version 002.006.000 of EcoStruxure Panel Server includes a fix for this vulnerability and is available for download here: \u2022 https://www.se.com/ww/en/download/document/PAS800_Fir mware_Package/ \u2022 Reboot needed: Yes
https://www.se.com/ww/en/download/document/PAS800_Firmware_Package/
Vendor fix
Version 002.006.000 of EcoStruxure Panel Server includes a fix for this vulnerability and is available for download here: \u2022 https://www.se.com/ww/en/download/document/PAS800V2_F irmware_Package/ \u2022 Reboot needed: Yes
https://www.se.com/ww/en/download/document/PAS800V2_Firmware_Package/
Vendor fix
Version 002.006.000 of EcoStruxure Panel Server includes a fix for this vulnerability and is available for download here: \u2022 https://www.se.com/ww/en/download/document/PAS600_Fir mware_Package/ \u2022 Reboot needed: Yes
https://www.se.com/ww/en/download/document/PAS600_Firmware_Package/
Vendor fix
Version 002.006.000 of EcoStruxure Panel Server includes a fix for this vulnerability and is available for download here: \u2022 https://www.se.com/ww/en/download/document/PAS600V2_ Firmware_Package/ \u2022 Reboot needed: Yes
https://www.se.com/ww/en/download/document/PAS600V2_Firmware_Package/
Vendor fix
Version 002.006.000 of EcoStruxure Panel Server includes a fix for this vulnerability and is available for download here: \u2022 https://www.se.com/ww/en/download/document/PAS400_Fir mware_Package/ \u2022 Reboot needed: Yes
https://www.se.com/ww/en/download/document/PAS400_Firmware_Package/
Relevant CWE: CWE-1188 Initialization of a Resource with an Insecure Default
\n| CVSS Version | \nBase Score | \nBase Severity | \nVector String | \n
|---|---|---|---|
| 3.1 | \n7.5 | \nHIGH | \nCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N | \n
We strongly recommend the following industry cybersecurity best practices. * Locate control and safety system networks and remote devices behind firewalls and isolate them from the business network. * Install physical controls so no unauthorized personnel can access your industrial control and safety systems, components, peripheral equipment, and networks. * Place all controllers in locked cabinets and never leave them in the \u201cProgram\u201d mode. * Never connect programming software to any network other than the network intended for that device. * Scan all methods of mobile data exchange with the isolated network such as CDs, USB drives, etc. before use in the terminals or any node connected to these networks. * Never allow mobile devices that have connected to any other network besides the intended network to connect to the safety or control networks without proper sanitation. * Minimize network exposure for all control system devices and systems and ensure that they are not accessible from the Internet. * When remote access is required, use secure methods, such as Virtual Private Networks (VPNs). Recognize that VPNs may have vulnerabilities and should be updated to the most current version available. Also, understand that VPNs are only as secure as the connected devices. For more information refer to the Schneider Electric [Recommended Cybersecurity Best Practices](https://www.se.com/us/en/download/document/7EN52-0390/) document.
\nThis document provides an overview of the identified vulnerability or vulnerabilities and actions required to mitigate. For more details and assistance on how to protect your installation, contact your local Schneider Electric representative or Schneider Electric Industrial Cybersecurity Services: https://www.se.com/ww/en/work/solutions/cybersecurity/. These organizations will be fully aware of this situation and can support you through the process. For further information related to cybersecurity in Schneider Electric's products, visit the company's cybersecurity support portal page: https://www.se.com/ww/en/work/support/cybersecurity/overview.jsp
\nTHIS NOTIFICATION DOCUMENT, THE INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN, AND ANY MATERIALS LINKED FROM IT (COLLECTIVELY, THIS \u201cNOTIFICATION\u201d) ARE INTENDED TO HELP PROVIDE AN OVERVIEW OF THE IDENTIFIED SITUATION AND SUGGESTED MITIGATION ACTIONS, REMEDIATION, FIX, AND/OR GENERAL SECURITY RECOMMENDATIONS AND IS PROVIDED ON AN \u201cAS-IS\u201d BASIS WITHOUT WARRANTY OR GUARANTEE OF ANY KIND. SCHNEIDER ELECTRIC DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES RELATING TO THIS NOTIFICATION, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. SCHNEIDER ELECTRIC MAKES NO WARRANTY THAT THE NOTIFICATION WILL RESOLVE THE IDENTIFIED SITUATION. IN NO EVENT SHALL SCHNEIDER ELECTRIC BE LIABLE FOR ANY DAMAGES OR LOSSES WHATSOEVER IN CONNECTION WITH THIS NOTIFICATION, INCLUDING DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, CONSEQUENTIAL, LOSS OF BUSINESS PROFITS OR SPECIAL DAMAGES, EVEN IF SCHNEIDER ELECTRIC HAS BEEN ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGES. YOUR USE OF THIS NOTIFICATION IS AT YOUR OWN RISK, AND YOU ARE SOLELY LIABLE FOR ANY DAMAGES TO YOUR SYSTEMS OR ASSETS OR OTHER LOSSES THAT MAY RESULT FROM YOUR USE OF THIS NOTIFICATION. SCHNEIDER ELECTRIC RESERVES THE RIGHT TO UPDATE OR CHANGE THIS NOTIFICATION AT ANY TIME AND IN ITS SOLE DISCRETION
\nSchneider's purpose is to create Impact by empowering all to make the most of our energy and resources, bridging progress and sustainability for all. We call this Life Is On. Our mission is to be the trusted partner in Sustainability and Efficiency. We are a global industrial technology leader bringing world-leading expertise in electrification, automation and digitization to smart industries, resilient infrastructure, future-proof data centers, intelligent buildings, and intuitive homes. Anchored by our deep domain expertise, we provide integrated end-to-end lifecycle AI enabled Industrial IoT solutions with connected products, automation, software and services, delivering digital twins to enable profitable growth for our customers. We are a people company with an ecosystem of 150,000 colleagues and more than a million partners operating in over 100 countries to ensure proximity to our customers and stakeholders. We embrace diversity and inclusion in everything we do, guided by our meaningful purpose of a sustainable future for all. www.se.com
\nThis product is provided subject to this Notification (https://www.cisa.gov/notification) and this Privacy & Use policy (https://www.cisa.gov/privacy-policy).
\nCISA recommends users take defensive measures to minimize the exploitation risk of these vulnerabilities.
\nMinimize network exposure for all control system devices and/or systems, and ensure they are not accessible from the internet.
\nLocate control system networks and remote devices behind firewalls and isolate them from business networks.
\nWhen remote access is required, use more secure methods, such as Virtual Private Networks (VPNs), recognizing VPNs may have vulnerabilities and should be updated to the most recent version available. Also recognize VPN is only as secure as its connected devices.
\nCISA reminds organizations to perform proper impact analysis and risk assessment prior to deploying defensive measures.
\nCISA also provides a section for control systems security recommended practices on the ICS webpage on cisa.gov. Several CISA products detailing cyber defense best practices are available for reading and download, including Improving Industrial Control Systems Cybersecurity with Defense-in-Depth Strategies.
\nCISA encourages organizations to implement recommended cybersecurity strategies for proactive defense of ICS assets. Additional mitigation guidance and recommended practices are publicly available on the ICS webpage at cisa.gov in the technical information paper, ICS-TIP-12-146-01B--Targeted Cyber Intrusion Detection and Mitigation Strategies.
\nOrganizations observing suspected malicious activity should follow established internal procedures and report findings to CISA for tracking and correlation against other incidents.
\nThis ICSA is a verbatim republication of Schneider Electric CPCERT SEVD-2026-132-04 from a direct conversion of the vendor's Common Security Advisory Framework (CSAF) advisory. This is republished to CISA's website as a means of increasing visibility and is provided \"as-is\" for informational purposes only. CISA is not responsible for the editorial or technical accuracy of republished advisories and provides no warranties of any kind regarding any information contained within this advisory. Further, CISA does not endorse any commercial product or service. Please contact Schneider Electric CPCERT directly for any questions regarding this advisory.
\n| Date | \nRevision | \nSummary | \n
|---|---|---|
| 2026-05-12 | \n1 | \nOriginal Release | \n
| 2026-06-09 | \n2 | \nInitial CISA Republication of Schneider Electric CPCERT SEVD-2026-132-04 advisory | \n
Schneider Electric is aware of a RADIUS protocol vulnerability affecting its Modicon Network Managed Switch product. The Modicon Network Managed Switch product provides connectivity for multiple Ethernet devices, network management, enhanced cyber security and more advanced switching features. Failure to apply the mitigation provided below may risk forgery attacks in RADIUS Protocol, which could result in modification of any valid Response (Access-Accept, Access-Reject, or Access-Challenge) to any other response which could result in the possibility of denial of service and loss of confidentiality, integrity of the devices connected to the switch.
\nThe following versions of Schneider Electric Modicon Network Managed Switches are affected:
\n| CVSS | \nVendor | \nEquipment | \nVulnerabilities | \n
|---|---|---|---|
| v3 9 | \nSchneider Electric | \nSchneider Electric Modicon Network Managed Switches | \nImproper Enforcement of Message Integrity During Transmission in a Communication Channel | \n
Additional information about CVE-2024-3596 can be found here:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2024-3596
\n\nMitigation
The default RADIUS configuration is not vulnerable. However, if the RADIUS Server Message Authenticator option is disabled, the product becomes vulnerable. We advise keeping this parameter in its default (enabled) state. This parameter can be configured via CLI and SNMP:TCSESM* CLI: radius server msgauthMIB: hmAgentRadiusServerMsgAuth
Mitigation
The default RADIUS configuration is not vulnerable. However, if the RADIUS Server Message Authenticator option is disabled, the product becomes vulnerable. We advise keeping this parameter in its default (enabled) state. This parameter can be configured via CLI and SNMP:MCSESM*, MCSESP* CLI: radius server auth modify msgauth MIB: hm2AgentRadiusServerMsgAuth
Mitigation
The default RADIUS configuration is not vulnerable. However, if the RADIUS Server Message Authenticator option is disabled, the product becomes vulnerable. We advise keeping this parameter in its default (enabled) state. This parameter can be configured via CLI and SNMP:MCSESR* CLI: radius server auth modify msgauth MIB: hm2AgentRadiusServerMsgAuth
Relevant CWE: CWE-924 Improper Enforcement of Message Integrity During Transmission in a Communication Channel
\n| CVSS Version | \nBase Score | \nBase Severity | \nVector String | \n
|---|---|---|---|
| 3.1 | \n9 | \nCRITICAL | \nCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H | \n
We strongly recommend the following industry cybersecurity best practices. * Locate control and safety system networks and remote devices behind firewalls and isolate them from the business network. * Install physical controls so no unauthorized personnel can access your industrial control and safety systems, components, peripheral equipment, and networks. * Place all controllers in locked cabinets and never leave them in the \u201cProgram\u201d mode. * Never connect programming software to any network other than the network intended for that device. * Scan all methods of mobile data exchange with the isolated network such as CDs, USB drives, etc. before use in the terminals or any node connected to these networks. * Never allow mobile devices that have connected to any other network besides the intended network to connect to the safety or control networks without proper sanitation. * Minimize network exposure for all control system devices and systems and ensure that they are not accessible from the Internet. * When remote access is required, use secure methods, such as Virtual Private Networks (VPNs). Recognize that VPNs may have vulnerabilities and should be updated to the most current version available. Also, understand that VPNs are only as secure as the connected devices. For more information refer to the Schneider Electric [Recommended Cybersecurity Best Practices](https://www.se.com/us/en/download/document/7EN52-0390/) document.
\nThis document provides an overview of the identified vulnerability or vulnerabilities and actions required to mitigate. For more details and assistance on how to protect your installation, contact your local Schneider Electric representative or Schneider Electric Industrial Cybersecurity Services: https://www.se.com/ww/en/work/solutions/cybersecurity/. These organizations will be fully aware of this situation and can support you through the process. For further information related to cybersecurity in Schneider Electric's products, visit the company's cybersecurity support portal page: https://www.se.com/ww/en/work/support/cybersecurity/overview.jsp
\nTHIS NOTIFICATION DOCUMENT, THE INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN, AND ANY MATERIALS LINKED FROM IT (COLLECTIVELY, THIS \u201cNOTIFICATION\u201d) ARE INTENDED TO HELP PROVIDE AN OVERVIEW OF THE IDENTIFIED SITUATION AND SUGGESTED MITIGATION ACTIONS, REMEDIATION, FIX, AND/OR GENERAL SECURITY RECOMMENDATIONS AND IS PROVIDED ON AN \u201cAS-IS\u201d BASIS WITHOUT WARRANTY OR GUARANTEE OF ANY KIND. SCHNEIDER ELECTRIC DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES RELATING TO THIS NOTIFICATION, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. SCHNEIDER ELECTRIC MAKES NO WARRANTY THAT THE NOTIFICATION WILL RESOLVE THE IDENTIFIED SITUATION. IN NO EVENT SHALL SCHNEIDER ELECTRIC BE LIABLE FOR ANY DAMAGES OR LOSSES WHATSOEVER IN CONNECTION WITH THIS NOTIFICATION, INCLUDING DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, CONSEQUENTIAL, LOSS OF BUSINESS PROFITS OR SPECIAL DAMAGES, EVEN IF SCHNEIDER ELECTRIC HAS BEEN ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGES. YOUR USE OF THIS NOTIFICATION IS AT YOUR OWN RISK, AND YOU ARE SOLELY LIABLE FOR ANY DAMAGES TO YOUR SYSTEMS OR ASSETS OR OTHER LOSSES THAT MAY RESULT FROM YOUR USE OF THIS NOTIFICATION. SCHNEIDER ELECTRIC RESERVES THE RIGHT TO UPDATE OR CHANGE THIS NOTIFICATION AT ANY TIME AND IN ITS SOLE DISCRETION
\nSchneider's purpose is to create Impact by empowering all to make the most of our energy and resources, bridging progress and sustainability for all. We call this Life Is On. Our mission is to be the trusted partner in Sustainability and Efficiency. We are a global industrial technology leader bringing world-leading expertise in electrification, automation and digitization to smart industries, resilient infrastructure, future-proof data centers, intelligent buildings, and intuitive homes. Anchored by our deep domain expertise, we provide integrated end-to-end lifecycle AI enabled Industrial IoT solutions with connected products, automation, software and services, delivering digital twins to enable profitable growth for our customers. We are a people company with an ecosystem of 150,000 colleagues and more than a million partners operating in over 100 countries to ensure proximity to our customers and stakeholders. We embrace diversity and inclusion in everything we do, guided by our meaningful purpose of a sustainable future for all. www.se.com
\nThis product is provided subject to this Notification (https://www.cisa.gov/notification) and this Privacy & Use policy (https://www.cisa.gov/privacy-policy).
\nCISA recommends users take defensive measures to minimize the exploitation risk of these vulnerabilities.
\nMinimize network exposure for all control system devices and/or systems, and ensure they are not accessible from the internet.
\nLocate control system networks and remote devices behind firewalls and isolate them from business networks.
\nWhen remote access is required, use more secure methods, such as Virtual Private Networks (VPNs), recognizing VPNs may have vulnerabilities and should be updated to the most recent version available. Also recognize VPN is only as secure as its connected devices.
\nCISA reminds organizations to perform proper impact analysis and risk assessment prior to deploying defensive measures.
\nCISA also provides a section for control systems security recommended practices on the ICS webpage on cisa.gov. Several CISA products detailing cyber defense best practices are available for reading and download, including Improving Industrial Control Systems Cybersecurity with Defense-in-Depth Strategies.
\nCISA encourages organizations to implement recommended cybersecurity strategies for proactive defense of ICS assets. Additional mitigation guidance and recommended practices are publicly available on the ICS webpage at cisa.gov in the technical information paper, ICS-TIP-12-146-01B--Targeted Cyber Intrusion Detection and Mitigation Strategies.
\nOrganizations observing suspected malicious activity should follow established internal procedures and report findings to CISA for tracking and correlation against other incidents.
\nThis ICSA is a verbatim republication of Schneider Electric CPCERT SEVD-2026-104-02 from a direct conversion of the vendor's Common Security Advisory Framework (CSAF) advisory. This is republished to CISA's website as a means of increasing visibility and is provided \"as-is\" for informational purposes only. CISA is not responsible for the editorial or technical accuracy of republished advisories and provides no warranties of any kind regarding any information contained within this advisory. Further, CISA does not endorse any commercial product or service. Please contact Schneider Electric CPCERT directly for any questions regarding this advisory.
\n| Date | \nRevision | \nSummary | \n
|---|---|---|
| 2026-04-14 | \n1 | \nOriginal Release | \n
| 2026-06-09 | \n2 | \nInitial CISA Republication of Schneider Electric CPCERT SEVD-2026-104-02 advisory | \n
CISA has added two new vulnerabilities to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) Catalog, based on evidence of active exploitation.
\nThese types of vulnerabilities are a frequent attack vector for malicious cyber actors and pose significant risks to the federal enterprise.
\nBinding Operational Directive (BOD) 22-01: Reducing the Significant Risk of Known Exploited Vulnerabilities established the KEV Catalog as a living list of known Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVEs) that carry significant risk to the federal enterprise. BOD 22-01 requires Federal Civilian Executive Branch (FCEB) agencies to remediate identified vulnerabilities by the due date to protect FCEB networks against active threats. See the BOD 22-01 Fact Sheet for more information.
\nAlthough BOD 22-01 only applies to FCEB agencies, CISA strongly urges all organizations to reduce their exposure to cyberattacks by prioritizing timely remediation of KEV Catalog vulnerabilities as part of their vulnerability management practice. CISA will continue to add vulnerabilities to the catalog that meet the specified criteria.
", "summary_is_html": true, "first_seen": "Mon, 08 Jun 26 12:00:00 +0000", "last_updated": "Mon, 08 Jun 26 12:00:00 +0000" }, { "id": "https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/alerts/2026/06/05/cisa-adds-one-known-exploited-vulnerability-catalog", "title": "CISA Adds One Known Exploited Vulnerability to Catalog", "source": "CISA Cybersecurity Advisory", "source_url": "https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/alerts/2026/06/05/cisa-adds-one-known-exploited-vulnerability-catalog", "summary": "CISA has added one new vulnerability to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) Catalog, based on evidence of active exploitation.
\nThis type of vulnerability is a frequent attack vector for malicious cyber actors and poses significant risks to the federal enterprise.
\nBinding Operational Directive (BOD) 22-01: Reducing the Significant Risk of Known Exploited Vulnerabilities established the KEV Catalog as a living list of known Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVEs) that carry significant risk to the federal enterprise. BOD 22-01 requires Federal Civilian Executive Branch (FCEB) agencies to remediate identified vulnerabilities by the due date to protect FCEB networks against active threats. See the BOD 22-01 Fact Sheet for more information.
\nAlthough BOD 22-01 only applies to FCEB agencies, CISA strongly urges all organizations to reduce their exposure to cyberattacks by prioritizing timely remediation of KEV Catalog vulnerabilities as part of their vulnerability management practice. CISA will continue to add vulnerabilities to the catalog that meet the specified criteria.
", "summary_is_html": true, "first_seen": "Fri, 05 Jun 26 12:00:00 +0000", "last_updated": "Fri, 05 Jun 26 12:00:00 +0000" }, { "id": "https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/ics-advisories/icsa-26-155-01", "title": "NAVTOR NavBox", "source": "CISA Cybersecurity Advisory", "source_url": "https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/ics-advisories/icsa-26-155-01", "summary": "\nSuccessful exploitation of this vulnerability could allow a local attacker to gain unauthorized access to SOAP methods, resulting in a disruption of operations.
\nThe following versions of NAVTOR NavBox are affected:
\n| CVSS | \nVendor | \nEquipment | \nVulnerabilities | \n
|---|---|---|---|
| v3 6.3 | \nNAVTOR | \nNAVTOR NavBox | \nUse of Hard-coded Credentials | \n
NAVTOR NavBox through version 4.16.1.20 contains hard-coded credentials within its Windows Communication Foundation (SOAP) implementation. If the SOAP functionality is enabled, a local attacker can extract credentials to bypass the intended transfer workflow. Successful authentication against the SOAP interface grants access to privileged WCF methods, enabling an attacker to write or overwrite files within application-defined paths.
\n\nVendor fix
NAVTOR has released a patch for NavBox in April 2026. Version 4.17.2.6 and later includes the fix. Users that have an active NavBox connection will automatically be kept up to date with the latest version. No user action required.
Relevant CWE: CWE-798 Use of Hard-coded Credentials
\n| CVSS Version | \nBase Score | \nBase Severity | \nVector String | \n
|---|---|---|---|
| 3.1 | \n6.3 | \nMEDIUM | \nCVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H | \n
| 4.0 | \n5.8 | \nMEDIUM | \nCVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:H/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N | \n
This product is provided subject to this Notification (https://www.cisa.gov/notification) and this Privacy & Use policy (https://www.cisa.gov/privacy-policy).
\nCISA recommends users take defensive measures to minimize the risk of exploitation of this vulnerability.
\nMinimize network exposure for all control system devices and/or systems, ensuring they are not accessible from the internet.
\nLocate control system networks and remote devices behind firewalls and isolating them from business networks.
\nWhen remote access is required, use more secure methods, such as Virtual Private Networks (VPNs), recognizing VPNs may have vulnerabilities and should be updated to the most current version available. Also recognize VPN is only as secure as the connected devices.
\nCISA reminds organizations to perform proper impact analysis and risk assessment prior to deploying defensive measures.
\nCISA also provides a section for control systems security recommended practices on the ICS webpage on cisa.gov/ics. Several CISA products detailing cyber defense best practices are available for reading and download, including Improving Industrial Control Systems Cybersecurity with Defense-in-Depth Strategies.
\nCISA encourages organizations to implement recommended cybersecurity strategies for proactive defense of ICS assets.
\nAdditional mitigation guidance and recommended practices are publicly available on the ICS webpage at cisa.gov/ics in the technical information paper, ICS-TIP-12-146-01B--Targeted Cyber Intrusion Detection and Mitigation Strategies.
\nOrganizations observing suspected malicious activity should follow established internal procedures and report findings to CISA for tracking and correlation against other incidents.
\nCISA also recommends users take the following measures to protect themselves from social engineering attacks:
\nDo not click web links or open attachments in unsolicited email messages.
\nRefer to Recognizing and Avoiding Email Scams for more information on avoiding email scams.
\nRefer to Avoiding Social Engineering and Phishing Attacks for more information on social engineering attacks.
\nNo known public exploitation specifically targeting this vulnerability has been reported to CISA at this time. This vulnerability is not exploitable remotely. This vulnerability has a high attack complexity.
\n| Date | \nRevision | \nSummary | \n
|---|---|---|
| 2026-06-04 | \n1 | \nInitial Publication | \n
B&R is aware of a vulnerability in the product versions listed as affected in the advisory. An attacker who successfully exploits this vulnerability could make the OPC-UA server of the product inaccessible.
\nThe following versions of B&R PPT30 Operating System are affected:
\n| CVSS | \nVendor | \nEquipment | \nVulnerabilities | \n
|---|---|---|---|
| v3 7.5 | \nB&R Industrial Automation GmbH | \nB&R PPT30 Operating System | \nAllocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling | \n
An Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling vulnerability in the OPC-UA Server used in PPT30 Operating System versions before 1.8.0 may be used by an unauthenticated network-based at-tacker to permanently prevent legitimate users from interacting with the service.
\n\nVendor fix
The problem is corrected in the following product versions: PPT30 Operating System 1.8.0. The OPC-UA server is not activated by default. B&R recommends that customers with the OPC-UA Server enabled to install the update at their earliest opportunity. The process to install updates is described in the user manual. The step to identify the installed product version is described in the user manual.
Mitigation
The optional OPC-UA server is not activated by default. The OPC-UA server shall only be activated, if required. PPT30 products are intended to operate at Levels 1 and 2 of the ABB ICS Cyber Security Reference Architecture. To restrict access to the OPC-UA server exclusively to trusted IP addresses, configure the South Firewall and/or the Control Network Firewall accordingly, and properly segment the network where the PPT30 operates. Additionally, ensure that the physical network interfaces assigned to the same logical network as the PPT30 are accessible only to authorized personnel. Refer to section \u201cGeneral security recommendations\u201d for further advise on how to keep your system secure.
Relevant CWE: CWE-770 Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling
\n| CVSS Version | \nBase Score | \nBase Severity | \nVector String | \n
|---|---|---|---|
| 3.1 | \n7.5 | \nHIGH | \nCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H/E:U/RL:O/RC:C | \n
The information in this document is subject to change without notice, and should not be construed as a commitment by B&R. B&R provides no warranty, express or implied, including warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose, for the information contained in this document, and assumes no responsibility for any errors that may appear in this document. In no event shall B&R or any of its suppliers be liable for direct, indirect, special, incidental or consequential damages of any nature or kind arising from the use of this document, or from the use of any hardware or software described in this document, even if B&R or its suppliers have been advised of the possibility of such damages. This document and parts hereof must not be reproduced or copied without written permission from B&R, and the contents hereof must not be imparted to a third party nor used for any unauthorized purpose. All rights to registrations and trademarks reside with their respective owners.
\nWhat causes the vulnerability? - The vulnerability is caused by insufficient handling of resources by the OPC-UA Server used by the PPT30 Operating System. What is PPT 30 Operating System - The PPT30 Operating System is the firmware required to use the B&R PPT30 hardware products. What might an attacker use the vulnerability to do? - An attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability could cause other users are no longer able to connect to the OPC-UA server on impacted devices. How could an attacker exploit the vulnerability? - An attacker could exploit the vulnerability by sending messages to an affected system node. This would require that the attacker has access to the system network, by connecting to the network either directly or through a wrongly configured or penetrated firewall, or that he installs malicious software on a system node or otherwise infects the network with malicious software. Recommended practices help mitigate such attacks, see section Mitigating Factors above. Could the vulnerability be exploited remotely? - Yes, an attacker who has network access to an affected system node could exploit this vulnerability. Recommended practices include that process control systems are physically protected, have no direct connections to the Internet, and are separated from other networks by means of a firewall system that has a minimal number of ports exposed. When this security advisory was issued, had this vulnerability been publicly disclosed? - No, B&R discovered the vulnerabilities through its own security analysis. When this security advisory was issued, had B&R received any reports that this vulnerability was being exploited? - No, B&R had not received any information indicating that this vulnerability had been exploited when this security advisory was originally issued
\nThis product is provided subject to this Notification (https://www.cisa.gov/notification) and this Privacy & Use policy (https://www.cisa.gov/privacy-policy).
\nCISA recommends users take defensive measures to minimize the exploitation risk of these vulnerabilities.
\nMinimize network exposure for all control system devices and/or systems, and ensure they are not accessible from the internet.
\nLocate control system networks and remote devices behind firewalls and isolate them from business networks.
\nWhen remote access is required, use more secure methods, such as Virtual Private Networks (VPNs), recognizing VPNs may have vulnerabilities and should be updated to the most recent version available. Also recognize VPN is only as secure as its connected devices.
\nCISA reminds organizations to perform proper impact analysis and risk assessment prior to deploying defensive measures.
\nCISA also provides a section for control systems security recommended practices on the ICS webpage on cisa.gov. Several CISA products detailing cyber defense best practices are available for reading and download, including Improving Industrial Control Systems Cybersecurity with Defense-in-Depth Strategies.
\nCISA encourages organizations to implement recommended cybersecurity strategies for proactive defense of ICS assets. Additional mitigation guidance and recommended practices are publicly available on the ICS webpage at cisa.gov in the technical information paper, ICS-TIP-12-146-01B--Targeted Cyber Intrusion Detection and Mitigation Strategies.
\nOrganizations observing suspected malicious activity should follow established internal procedures and report findings to CISA for tracking and correlation against other incidents.
\nThis ICSA is a verbatim republication of ABB PSIRT SA25P006 from a direct conversion of the vendor's Common Security Advisory Framework (CSAF) advisory. This is republished to CISA's website as a means of increasing visibility and is provided \"as-is\" for informational purposes only. CISA is not responsible for the editorial or technical accuracy of republished advisories and provides no warranties of any kind regarding any information contained within this advisory. Further, CISA does not endorse any commercial product or service. Please contact ABB PSIRT directly for any questions regarding this advisory.
\n| Date | \nRevision | \nSummary | \n
|---|---|---|
| 2026-05-26 | \n1 | \nInitial version. | \n
| 2026-06-04 | \n2 | \nInitial CISA Republication of ABB PSIRT SA25P006 advisory | \n
Hitachi Energy is aware of vulnerabilities that affect RTU500 product versions listed in this document. If exploited, these vulnerabilities primarily impact product availability, with potential secondary impacts on confidentiality and integrity. Please refer to the Recommended Immediate Actions for information about the mitigation/remediation.
\nThe following versions of Hitachi Energy RTU500 are affected:
\n| CVSS | \nVendor | \nEquipment | \nVulnerabilities | \n
|---|---|---|---|
| v3 7.8 | \nHitachi Energy | \nHitachi Energy RTU500 | \nNULL Pointer Dereference, Integer Overflow or Wraparound, Loop with Unreachable Exit Condition ('Infinite Loop') | \n
CWE-476: NULL Pointer Dereference. Issue summary: Processing a malformed PKCS#12 file can trigger a NULL pointer dereference in the PKCS12_item_decrypt_d2i_ex() function. Impact summary: A NULL pointer dereference can trigger a crash which leads to Denial of Service for an application processing PKCS#12 files. The PKCS12_item_decrypt_d2i_ex() function does not check whether the oct parameter is NULL before dereferencing it. When called from PKCS12_unpack_p7encdata() with a malformed PKCS#12 file, this parameter can be NULL, causing Denial of Service impact. The vulnerability is limited to Denial of Service and cannot be escalated to achieve code execution or memory disclosure. Product is affected, if a privileged user uploads a malformed PKCS#12 certificate via web interface or if PKI client functionality is configured.
\n\nVendor fix
Update to CMU Firmware version 13.8.2
Mitigation
Follow general mitigation factors/workarounds
Vendor fix
Update to CMU Firmware version 13.7.9 (when available) or 13.8.2
Relevant CWE: CWE-476 NULL Pointer Dereference
\n| CVSS Version | \nBase Score | \nBase Severity | \nVector String | \n
|---|---|---|---|
| 3.1 | \n6.5 | \nMEDIUM | \nCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H | \n
CWE-476: NULL Pointer Dereference. In libexpat before 2.7.4, XML_ExternalEntityParserCreate does not copy unknown encoding handler user data, causing Denial of Service impact. Product is only affected if IEC 61850 functionality is configured.
\n\nVendor fix
Update to CMU Firmware version 13.8.2
Mitigation
Follow general mitigation factors/workarounds
Vendor fix
Update to CMU Firmware version 13.7.9 (when available) or 13.8.2
Relevant CWE: CWE-476 NULL Pointer Dereference
\n| CVSS Version | \nBase Score | \nBase Severity | \nVector String | \n
|---|---|---|---|
| 3.1 | \n2.5 | \nLOW | \nCVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L | \n
CWE-190: Integer Overflow or Wraparound. In libexpat before 2.7.4, the doContent function does not properly determine the buffer size bufSize because there is no integer overflow check for tag buffer reallocation, primarily causing Denial of Service and potentially confidentiality and integrity impact to the product. Product is only affected if IEC 61850 functionality is configured.
\n\nVendor fix
Update to CMU Firmware version 13.8.2
Mitigation
Follow general mitigation factors/workarounds
Vendor fix
Update to CMU Firmware version 13.7.9 (when available) or 13.8.2
Relevant CWE: CWE-190 Integer Overflow or Wraparound
\n| CVSS Version | \nBase Score | \nBase Severity | \nVector String | \n
|---|---|---|---|
| 3.1 | \n7.8 | \nHIGH | \nCVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | \n
CWE-476: NULL Pointer Dereference. libexpat before 2.7.5 allows a NULL pointer dereference with empty external parameter entity content, causing Denial of Service impact. Product is only affected if IEC 61850 functionality is configured.
\n\nVendor fix
Update to CMU Firmware version 13.8.2
Mitigation
Follow general mitigation factors/workarounds
Vendor fix
Update to CMU Firmware version 13.7.9 (when available) or 13.8.2
Relevant CWE: CWE-476 NULL Pointer Dereference
\n| CVSS Version | \nBase Score | \nBase Severity | \nVector String | \n
|---|---|---|---|
| 3.1 | \n5.5 | \nMEDIUM | \nCVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H | \n
CWE-835: Loop with Unreachable Exit Condition ('Infinite Loop'). libexpat before 2.7.5 allows an infinite loop while parsing DTD content, causing Denial of Service impact. Product is only affected if IEC 61850 functionality is configured.
\n\nVendor fix
Update to CMU Firmware version 13.8.2
Mitigation
Follow general mitigation factors/workarounds
Vendor fix
Update to CMU Firmware version 13.7.9 (when available) or 13.8.2
Relevant CWE: CWE-835 Loop with Unreachable Exit Condition ('Infinite Loop')
\n| CVSS Version | \nBase Score | \nBase Severity | \nVector String | \n
|---|---|---|---|
| 3.1 | \n5.5 | \nMEDIUM | \nCVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H | \n
CWE-476: NULL Pointer Dereference. libexpat before 2.7.5 allows a NULL pointer dereference in the function setContext on retry after an earlier out-of-memory condition, causing Denial of Service impact. Product is only affected if IEC 61850 functionality is configured.
\n\nVendor fix
Update to CMU Firmware version 13.8.2
Mitigation
Follow general mitigation factors/workarounds
Vendor fix
Update to CMU Firmware version 13.7.9 (when available) or 13.8.2
Relevant CWE: CWE-476 NULL Pointer Dereference
\n| CVSS Version | \nBase Score | \nBase Severity | \nVector String | \n
|---|---|---|---|
| 3.1 | \n5.5 | \nMEDIUM | \nCVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H | \n
CWE-476: NULL Pointer Dereference. IEC 60870-5-104 used in bidirectional mode is vulnerable for a NULL pointer dereferencing, if a specially crafted sequence of messages is sent for a certain time, causing Denial of Service impact. Product is only affected if IEC 60870-5-104 functionality in bidirectional mode (BCI) is configured.
\n\nVendor fix
Update to CMU Firmware version 13.8.2
Mitigation
Follow general mitigation factors/workarounds
Vendor fix
Update to CMU Firmware version 13.7.8
Relevant CWE: CWE-476 NULL Pointer Dereference
\n| CVSS Version | \nBase Score | \nBase Severity | \nVector String | \n
|---|---|---|---|
| 3.1 | \n6.5 | \nMEDIUM | \nCVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H | \n
| 4.0 | \n6.9 | \nMEDIUM | \nCVSS:4.0/AV:A/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N | \n
The information in this document is subject to change without notice and should not be construed as a commitment by Hitachi Energy. Hitachi Energy provides no warranty, express or implied, including warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose, for the information contained in this document, and assumes no responsibility for any errors that may appear in this document. In no event shall Hitachi Energy or any of its suppliers be liable for direct, indirect, special, incidental or consequential damages of any nature or kind arising from the use of this document, or from the use of any hardware or software described in this document, even if Hitachi Energy or its suppliers have been advised of the possibility of such damages. This document and parts hereof must not be reproduced or copied without written permission from Hitachi Energy and the contents hereof must not be imparted to a third party nor used for any unauthorized purpose. All rights to registrations and trademarks reside with their respective owners.
\nFor additional information and support please contact your product provider or Hitachi Energy service organization. For contact information, see https://www.hitachienergy.com/contact-us/ for Hitachi Energy contact-centers.
\nRecommended security practices and firewall configurations can help protect a process control network from attacks that originate from outside the network. Such practices include that process control systems are physically protected from direct access by unauthorized personnel, have no direct connections to the Internet, and are separated from other networks by means of a firewall system that has a minimal number of ports exposed, and others that have to be evaluated case by case. Process control systems should not be used for Internet surfing, instant messaging, or receiving e-mails. Portable computers and removable storage media should be carefully scanned for viruses before they are connected to a control system. Proper password policies and processes should be followed. Additional information on Industrial Control Systems Cybersecurity Best Practices can be found in the following Hitachi Energy Cybersecurity Notification. Cybersecurity Advisory - Industrial Control Systems Cybersecurity Best Practices
\nSSVCv2/E:N/A:N/2026-05-26T08:50:36Z/
\nThis product is provided subject to this Notification (https://www.cisa.gov/notification) and this Privacy & Use policy (https://www.cisa.gov/privacy-policy).
\nCISA recommends users take defensive measures to minimize the exploitation risk of this vulnerability.
\nMinimize network exposure for all control system devices and/or systems, and ensure they are not accessible from the internet.
\nLocate control system networks and remote devices behind firewalls and isolate them from business networks.
\nWhen remote access is required, use more secure methods, such as Virtual Private Networks (VPNs), recognizing VPNs may have vulnerabilities and should be updated to the most recent version available. Also recognize VPN is only as secure as its connected devices.
\nCISA reminds organizations to perform proper impact analysis and risk assessment prior to deploying defensive measures.
\nCISA also provides a section for control systems security recommended practices on the ICS webpage on cisa.gov. Several CISA products detailing cyber defense best practices are available for reading and download, including Improving Industrial Control Systems Cybersecurity with Defense-in-Depth Strategies.
\nCISA encourages organizations to implement recommended cybersecurity strategies for proactive defense of ICS assets. Additional mitigation guidance and recommended practices are publicly available on the ICS webpage at cisa.gov in the technical information paper, ICS-TIP-12-146-01B--Targeted Cyber Intrusion Detection and Mitigation Strategies.
\nOrganizations observing suspected malicious activity should follow established internal procedures and report findings to CISA for tracking and correlation against other incidents.
\nThis ICSA is a verbatim republication of Hitachi Energy PSIRT 8DBD000252 from a direct conversion of the vendor's Common Security Advisory Framework (CSAF) advisory. This is republished to CISA's website as a means of increasing visibility and is provided \"as-is\" for informational purposes only. CISA is not responsible for the editorial or technical accuracy of republished advisories and provides no warranties of any kind regarding any information contained within this advisory. Further, CISA does not endorse any commercial product or service. Please contact Hitachi Energy PSIRT directly for any questions regarding this advisory.
\n| Date | \nRevision | \nSummary | \n
|---|---|---|
| 2026-05-26 | \n1 | \nInitial public release | \n
| 2026-06-04 | \n2 | \nInitial CISA Republication of Hitachi Energy PSIRT 8DBD000252 advisory | \n
Hitachi Energy is aware of a buffer overflow vulnerability that affects MACH HiDraw product versions listed in this document. Successful exploitation of this vulnerability could lead to a buffer overflow condition, potentially resulting in application outages (denial of service) and possible arbitrary code execution. Please refer to the Recommended Immediate Actions for information about the mitigation/remediation.
\nThe following versions of Hitachi Energy MACH HiDraw are affected:
\n| CVSS | \nVendor | \nEquipment | \nVulnerabilities | \n
|---|---|---|---|
| v3 5.5 | \nHitachi Energy | \nHitachi Energy MACH HiDraw | \nHeap-based Buffer Overflow | \n
A heap-based buffer overflow vulnerability exists in XML parser functionality in the HiDraw. An authenticated malicious user with local access can exploit this vulnerability using a specially crafted XML file which may lead to memory corruption and potential arbitrary code execution. Successful exploitation could result in application crashes (denial of service) and compromise the confidentiality and integrity of the affected system.
\n\nVendor fix
Fixed in version 9.23. Due to the complexity of individual implementation of the project, contact local account team for further information on possible upgrades.
Mitigation
Hitachi's General Mitigation Factors/Workarounds: Recommended security practices and firewall configurations can help protect a process control network from attacks that originate from outside the network. Such practices include that process control systems are physically protected from direct access by unauthorized personnel, have no direct connections to the Internet, and are separated from other networks by means of a firewall system that has a minimal number of ports exposed, and others that have to be evaluated case by case. Process control systems should not be used for Internet surfing, instant messaging, or receiving e-mails. Portable computers and removable storage media should be carefully scanned for viruses before they are connected to a control system. Proper password policies and processes should be followed.
Relevant CWE: CWE-122 Heap-based Buffer Overflow
\n| CVSS Version | \nBase Score | \nBase Severity | \nVector String | \n
|---|---|---|---|
| 3.1 | \n5.5 | \nMEDIUM | \nCVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:H | \n
| 4.0 | \n4.4 | \nMEDIUM | \nCVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:H/AT:P/PR:L/UI:A/VC:L/VI:L/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N | \n
The information in this document is subject to change without notice and should not be construed as a commitment by Hitachi Energy. Hitachi Energy provides no warranty, express or implied, including warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose, for the information contained in this document, and assumes no responsibility for any errors that may appear in this document. In no event shall Hitachi Energy or any of its suppliers be liable for direct, indirect, special, incidental or consequential damages of any nature or kind arising from the use of this document, or from the use of any hardware or software described in this document, even if Hitachi Energy or its suppliers have been advised of the possibility of such damages. This document and parts hereof must not be reproduced or copied without written permission from Hitachi Energy and the contents hereof must not be imparted to a third party nor used for any unauthorized purpose. All rights to registrations and trademarks reside with their respective owners.
\nFor additional information and support please contact your product provider or Hitachi Energy service organization. For contact information, see https://www.hitachienergy.com/contact-us/ for Hitachi Energy contact-centers.
\nRecommended security practices and firewall configurations can help protect a process control network from attacks that originate from outside the network. Such practices include that process control systems are physically protected from direct access by unauthorized personnel, have no direct connections to the Internet, and are separated from other networks by means of a firewall system that has a minimal number of ports exposed, and others that have to be evaluated case by case. Process control systems should not be used for Internet surfing, instant messaging, or receiving e-mails. Portable computers and removable storage media should be carefully scanned for viruses before they are connected to a control system. Proper password policies and processes should be followed. Additional information on Industrial Control Systems Cybersecurity Best Practices can be found in the following Hitachi Energy Cybersecurity Notification. Cybersecurity Advisory - Industrial Control Systems Cybersecurity Best Practices
\nSSVCv2/E:N/A:N/2026-05-26T09:04:54Z/
\nThis product is provided subject to this Notification (https://www.cisa.gov/notification) and this Privacy & Use policy (https://www.cisa.gov/privacy-policy).
\nCISA recommends users take defensive measures to minimize the exploitation risk of these vulnerabilities.
\nMinimize network exposure for all control system devices and/or systems, and ensure they are not accessible from the internet.
\nLocate control system networks and remote devices behind firewalls and isolate them from business networks.
\nWhen remote access is required, use more secure methods, such as Virtual Private Networks (VPNs), recognizing VPNs may have vulnerabilities and should be updated to the most recent version available. Also recognize VPN is only as secure as its connected devices.
\nCISA reminds organizations to perform proper impact analysis and risk assessment prior to deploying defensive measures.
\nCISA also provides a section for control systems security recommended practices on the ICS webpage on cisa.gov. Several CISA products detailing cyber defense best practices are available for reading and download, including Improving Industrial Control Systems Cybersecurity with Defense-in-Depth Strategies.
\nCISA encourages organizations to implement recommended cybersecurity strategies for proactive defense of ICS assets. Additional mitigation guidance and recommended practices are publicly available on the ICS webpage at cisa.gov in the technical information paper, ICS-TIP-12-146-01B--Targeted Cyber Intrusion Detection and Mitigation Strategies.
\nOrganizations observing suspected malicious activity should follow established internal procedures and report findings to CISA for tracking and correlation against other incidents.
\nThis ICSA is a verbatim republication of Hitachi Energy PSIRT 8DBD000248 from a direct conversion of the vendor's Common Security Advisory Framework (CSAF) advisory. This is republished to CISA's website as a means of increasing visibility and is provided \"as-is\" for informational purposes only. CISA is not responsible for the editorial or technical accuracy of republished advisories and provides no warranties of any kind regarding any information contained within this advisory. Further, CISA does not endorse any commercial product or service. Please contact Hitachi Energy PSIRT directly for any questions regarding this advisory.
\n| Date | \nRevision | \nSummary | \n
|---|---|---|
| 2026-05-26 | \n1 | \nInitial public release | \n
| 2026-06-04 | \n2 | \nInitial CISA Republication of Hitachi Energy PSIRT 8DBD000248 advisory | \n
Hitachi Energy is aware of vulnerabilities that affect ITT600 Explorer product versions listed in this document. These vulnerabilities can be exploited to carry out Denial of Service (DoS) attack on the product. The vulnerabilities only affect Hitachi Energy Integrated Testing Tool ITT600 SA Explorer without affecting IEC 61850 system endpoints. Please refer to the Recommended Immediate Actions for information about the mitigation/remediation.
\nThe following versions of Hitachi Energy ITT600 Explorer are affected:
\n| CVSS | \nVendor | \nEquipment | \nVulnerabilities | \n
|---|---|---|---|
| v3 7.5 | \nHitachi Energy | \nHitachi Energy ITT600 Explorer | \nUncontrolled Recursion, Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling | \n
A stack overflow vulnerability exists in the libexpat library used by the IEC61850 functionality supported by the product. A malicious user with local access could use a crafted IEC61850 message to exploit the vulnerability in the libexpat library. This issue could lead to denial of service (DoS) or, in some cases, exploitable memory corruption, depending on the environment and library usage. Product is only affected if IEC61850 server simulation is used.
\n\nVendor fix
Update to version 2.1 SP6 HF1
Vendor fix
Upgrade to version 2.2 when available
Relevant CWE: CWE-674 Uncontrolled Recursion
\n| CVSS Version | \nBase Score | \nBase Severity | \nVector String | \n
|---|---|---|---|
| 3.1 | \n7.5 | \nHIGH | \nCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H | \n
A vulnerability exists in libexpat used by the product allowing attackers to trigger large dynamic memory allocations via a small document that is submitted for parsing. Product is only affected if IEC61850 server simulation is used.
\n\nVendor fix
Update to version 2.1 SP6 HF1
Vendor fix
Upgrade to version 2.2 when available
Relevant CWE: CWE-770 Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling
\n| CVSS Version | \nBase Score | \nBase Severity | \nVector String | \n
|---|---|---|---|
| 3.1 | \n7.5 | \nHIGH | \nCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H | \n
The information in this document is subject to change without notice and should not be construed as a commitment by Hitachi Energy. Hitachi Energy provides no warranty, express or implied, including warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose, for the information contained in this document, and assumes no responsibility for any errors that may appear in this document. In no event shall Hitachi Energy or any of its suppliers be liable for direct, indirect, special, incidental or consequential damages of any nature or kind arising from the use of this document, or from the use of any hardware or software described in this document, even if Hitachi Energy or its suppliers have been advised of the possibility of such damages. This document and parts hereof must not be reproduced or copied without written permission from Hitachi Energy and the contents hereof must not be imparted to a third party nor used for any unauthorized purpose. All rights to registrations and trademarks reside with their respective owners.
\nFor additional information and support please contact your product provider or Hitachi Energy service organization. For contact information, see https://www.hitachienergy.com/contact-us/ for Hitachi Energy contact-centers.
\nRecommended security practices and firewall configurations can help protect a process control network from attacks that originate from outside the network. Such practices include that process control systems are physically protected from direct access by unauthorized personnel, have no direct connections to the Internet, and are separated from other networks by means of a firewall system that has a minimal number of ports exposed, and others that have to be evaluated case by case. Process control systems should not be used for Internet surfing, instant messaging, or receiving e-mails. Portable computers and removable storage media should be carefully scanned for viruses before they are connected to a control system. Proper password policies and processes should be followed. Additional information on Industrial Control Systems Cybersecurity Best Practices can be found in the following Hitachi Energy Cybersecurity Notification. Cybersecurity Advisory - Industrial Control Systems Cybersecurity Best Practices
\nSSVCv2/E:N/A:Y/2026-05-26T08:58:04Z/
\nThis product is provided subject to this Notification (https://www.cisa.gov/notification) and this Privacy & Use policy (https://www.cisa.gov/privacy-policy).
\nCISA recommends users take defensive measures to minimize the exploitation risk of this vulnerability.
\nMinimize network exposure for all control system devices and/or systems, and ensure they are not accessible from the internet.
\nLocate control system networks and remote devices behind firewalls and isolate them from business networks.
\nWhen remote access is required, use more secure methods, such as Virtual Private Networks (VPNs), recognizing VPNs may have vulnerabilities and should be updated to the most recent version available. Also recognize VPN is only as secure as its connected devices.
\nCISA reminds organizations to perform proper impact analysis and risk assessment prior to deploying defensive measures.
\nCISA also provides a section for control systems security recommended practices on the ICS webpage on cisa.gov. Several CISA products detailing cyber defense best practices are available for reading and download, including Improving Industrial Control Systems Cybersecurity with Defense-in-Depth Strategies.
\nCISA encourages organizations to implement recommended cybersecurity strategies for proactive defense of ICS assets. Additional mitigation guidance and recommended practices are publicly available on the ICS webpage at cisa.gov in the technical information paper, ICS-TIP-12-146-01B--Targeted Cyber Intrusion Detection and Mitigation Strategies.
\nOrganizations observing suspected malicious activity should follow established internal procedures and report findings to CISA for tracking and correlation against other incidents.
\nThis ICSA is a verbatim republication of Hitachi Energy PSIRT 8DBD000241 from a direct conversion of the vendor's Common Security Advisory Framework (CSAF) advisory. This is republished to CISA's website as a means of increasing visibility and is provided \"as-is\" for informational purposes only. CISA is not responsible for the editorial or technical accuracy of republished advisories and provides no warranties of any kind regarding any information contained within this advisory. Further, CISA does not endorse any commercial product or service. Please contact Hitachi Energy PSIRT directly for any questions regarding this advisory.
\n| Date | \nRevision | \nSummary | \n
|---|---|---|
| 2026-05-26 | \n1 | \nInitial public release | \n
| 2026-06-04 | \n2 | \nInitial CISA Republication of Hitachi Energy PSIRT 8DBD000241 advisory | \n
CISA has added one new vulnerability to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) Catalog, based on evidence of active exploitation.
\nThis type of vulnerability is a frequent attack vector for malicious cyber actors and poses significant risks to the federal enterprise.
\nBinding Operational Directive (BOD) 22-01: Reducing the Significant Risk of Known Exploited Vulnerabilities established the KEV Catalog as a living list of known Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVEs) that carry significant risk to the federal enterprise. BOD 22-01 requires Federal Civilian Executive Branch (FCEB) agencies to remediate identified vulnerabilities by the due date to protect FCEB networks against active threats. See the BOD 22-01 Fact Sheet for more information.
\nAlthough BOD 22-01 only applies to FCEB agencies, CISA strongly urges all organizations to reduce their exposure to cyberattacks by prioritizing timely remediation of KEV Catalog vulnerabilities as part of their vulnerability management practice. CISA will continue to add vulnerabilities to the catalog that meet the specified criteria.
", "summary_is_html": true, "first_seen": "Wed, 03 Jun 26 12:00:00 +0000", "last_updated": "Wed, 03 Jun 26 12:00:00 +0000" }, { "id": "https://www.cisa.gov/resources-tools/resources/cisa-and-partners-urge-hardening-automatic-tank-gauge-systems", "title": "CISA and Partners Urge Hardening Automatic Tank Gauge Systems", "source": "CISA Cybersecurity Advisory", "source_url": "https://www.cisa.gov/resources-tools/resources/cisa-and-partners-urge-hardening-automatic-tank-gauge-systems", "summary": "CISA and Partners Urge Hardening Automatic Tank Gauge Systems
\nThe Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the National Security Agency (NSA), the Department of Energy (DOE), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), the Department of Transportation (DOT), and the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA)\u2014hereafter referred to as \u201cthe authoring organizations\u201d\u2014are aware of malicious cyber activity targeting U.S.-based automatic tank gauge (ATG) systems. ATG systems are widely used throughout the Energy, Chemical, Food and Agriculture, and Transportation Systems Sectors for automated and remote monitoring of storage tank parameters, including fuel and liquid levels, temperature, and possible leak detection. The authoring organizations urge ATG owners and operators to defend against this malicious activity by securing their ATG systems with strong passwords and by removing them from the internet to reduce public exposure.
\nThe recent malicious cyber activity observed by the authoring organizations\u2014which the U.S. government has not yet attributed to a nation-state or threat actor group\u2014involves cyber threat actors compromising internet-exposed ATG systems and subsequently modifying them through command execution. This fact sheet provides insight into probable tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) leveraged by these cyber actors, highlights risk factors associated with such compromises, and provides mitigation guidance and resources to reduce the likelihood of continued malicious activity targeting U.S.-based ATG systems.
\nCyber threat actors may exploit flaws in ATG systems through multiple attack vectors:
\nShould a cyber threat actor exploit these vulnerabilities and compromise an ATG system, they could disrupt or manipulate the below critical functions by interfacing directly with the tank management as though they possessed legitimate physical access to the system console. The cyber threat actors could:
\nThe authoring organizations recommend ATG owners immediately implement the following recommendations:
\nThe authoring organizations recommend ATG owners and operators review the following resources and implement suggested mitigations, where possible, to enhance their security posture.
\nThe authoring organizations recommend U.S. organizations report suspicious or criminal activity related to information provided in this fact sheet.
\nThe information in this report is being provided \u201cas is\u201d for informational purposes only. The authoring organizations do not endorse any commercial entity, product, company, or service, including any entities, products, or services linked within this document. Any reference to specific commercial entities, products, processes, or services by service mark, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not constitute or imply endorsement, recommendation, or favor by the authoring organizations.
\n1 Pedro Umbelino, \u201cCritical Vulnerabilities Discovered in Automated Tank Gauge Systems,\u201d Bitsight, October 11, 2023, bitsight.com/blog/critical-vulnerabilities-discovered-automated-tank-gauge-systems.
\nCISA has added two new vulnerabilities to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) Catalog, based on evidence of active exploitation.
\nThese types of vulnerabilities are a frequent attack vector for malicious cyber actors and pose significant risks to the federal enterprise.
\nBinding Operational Directive (BOD) 22-01: Reducing the Significant Risk of Known Exploited Vulnerabilities established the KEV Catalog as a living list of known Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVEs) that carry significant risk to the federal enterprise. BOD 22-01 requires Federal Civilian Executive Branch (FCEB) agencies to remediate identified vulnerabilities by the due date to protect FCEB networks against active threats. See the BOD 22-01 Fact Sheet for more information.
\nAlthough BOD 22-01 only applies to FCEB agencies, CISA strongly urges all organizations to reduce their exposure to cyberattacks by prioritizing timely remediation of KEV Catalog vulnerabilities as part of their vulnerability management practice. CISA will continue to add vulnerabilities to the catalog that meet the specified criteria.
", "summary_is_html": true, "first_seen": "Tue, 02 Jun 26 12:00:00 +0000", "last_updated": "Tue, 02 Jun 26 12:00:00 +0000" }, { "id": "https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/alerts/2026/06/01/cisa-adds-one-known-exploited-vulnerability-catalog", "title": "CISA Adds One Known Exploited Vulnerability to Catalog", "source": "CISA Cybersecurity Advisory", "source_url": "https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/alerts/2026/06/01/cisa-adds-one-known-exploited-vulnerability-catalog", "summary": "CISA has added one new vulnerability to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) Catalog, based on evidence of active exploitation.
\nThis type of vulnerability is a frequent attack vectors for malicious cyber actors and poses significant risks to the federal enterprise.
\nBinding Operational Directive (BOD) 22-01: Reducing the Significant Risk of Known Exploited Vulnerabilities established the KEV Catalog as a living list of known Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVEs) that carry significant risk to the federal enterprise. BOD 22-01 requires Federal Civilian Executive Branch (FCEB) agencies to remediate identified vulnerabilities by the due date to protect FCEB networks against active threats. See the BOD 22-01 Fact Sheet for more information.
\nAlthough BOD 22-01 only applies to FCEB agencies, CISA strongly urges all organizations to reduce their exposure to cyberattacks by prioritizing timely remediation of KEV Catalog vulnerabilities as part of their vulnerability management practice. CISA will continue to add vulnerabilities to the catalog that meet the specified criteria.
", "summary_is_html": true, "first_seen": "Mon, 01 Jun 26 12:00:00 +0000", "last_updated": "Mon, 01 Jun 26 12:00:00 +0000" }, { "id": "https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/alerts/2026/05/29/cisa-adds-one-known-exploited-vulnerability-catalog", "title": "CISA Adds One Known Exploited Vulnerability to Catalog", "source": "CISA Cybersecurity Advisory", "source_url": "https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/alerts/2026/05/29/cisa-adds-one-known-exploited-vulnerability-catalog", "summary": "CISA has added one new vulnerability to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) Catalog, based on evidence of active exploitation.
\nThis type of vulnerability is a frequent attack vectors for malicious cyber actors and poses significant risks to the federal enterprise.
\nBinding Operational Directive (BOD) 22-01: Reducing the Significant Risk of Known Exploited Vulnerabilities established the KEV Catalog as a living list of known Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVEs) that carry significant risk to the federal enterprise. BOD 22-01 requires Federal Civilian Executive Branch (FCEB) agencies to remediate identified vulnerabilities by the due date to protect FCEB networks against active threats. See the BOD 22-01 Fact Sheet for more information.
\nAlthough BOD 22-01 only applies to FCEB agencies, CISA strongly urges all organizations to reduce their exposure to cyberattacks by prioritizing timely remediation of KEV Catalog vulnerabilities as part of their vulnerability management practice. CISA will continue to add vulnerabilities to the catalog that meet the specified criteria.
", "summary_is_html": true, "first_seen": "Fri, 29 May 26 12:00:00 +0000", "last_updated": "Fri, 29 May 26 12:00:00 +0000" }, { "id": "https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/ics-advisories/icsa-26-148-01", "title": "MacGregor Voyage Data Recorder (VDR) G4e", "source": "CISA Cybersecurity Advisory", "source_url": "https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/ics-advisories/icsa-26-148-01", "summary": "\nSuccessful exploitation of these vulnerabilities could result in an attacker gaining administrator access to the device.
\nThe following versions of MacGregor Voyage Data Recorder (VDR) G4e are affected:
\n| CVSS | \nVendor | \nEquipment | \nVulnerabilities | \n
|---|---|---|---|
| v3 8.3 | \nDanelec | \nMacGregor Voyage Data Recorder (VDR) G4e | \nUse of Default Credentials, Insufficiently Protected Credentials, Use of Password Hash With Insufficient Computational Effort, Use of Hard-coded Credentials, Files or Directories Accessible to External Parties | \n
The VDR device includes a default username and password, with no enforced password change.
\n\nVendor fix
Danelec has released firmware version V5.250 to resolve these vulnerabilities. Users of MacGregor Voyage Data Recorder (VDR) G4e devices are encouraged to update the firmware at the earliest service attendance rather than waiting for an annual performance test. Contact Danelec with additional questions: https://www.danelec.com/contact
https://www.danelec.com/contact
Relevant CWE: CWE-1392 Use of Default Credentials
\n| CVSS Version | \nBase Score | \nBase Severity | \nVector String | \n
|---|---|---|---|
| 3.1 | \n8.3 | \nHIGH | \nCVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L | \n
| 4.0 | \n8.7 | \nHIGH | \nCVSS:4.0/AV:A/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N | \n
An authenticated user can download a backup of the device which includes account data and password hashes.
\n\nVendor fix
Danelec has released firmware version V5.250 to resolve these vulnerabilities. Users of MacGregor Voyage Data Recorder (VDR) G4e devices are encouraged to update the firmware at the earliest service attendance rather than waiting for an annual performance test. Contact Danelec with additional questions: https://www.danelec.com/contact
https://www.danelec.com/contact
Relevant CWE: CWE-522 Insufficiently Protected Credentials
\n| CVSS Version | \nBase Score | \nBase Severity | \nVector String | \n
|---|---|---|---|
| 3.1 | \n5.4 | \nMEDIUM | \nCVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N | \n
| 4.0 | \n5.9 | \nMEDIUM | \nCVSS:4.0/AV:A/AC:H/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N | \n
Passwords are stored with a hashing method which limits password length and is susceptible to brute force attacks.
\n\nVendor fix
Danelec has released firmware version V5.250 to resolve these vulnerabilities. Users of MacGregor Voyage Data Recorder (VDR) G4e devices are encouraged to update the firmware at the earliest service attendance rather than waiting for an annual performance test. Contact Danelec with additional questions: https://www.danelec.com/contact
https://www.danelec.com/contact
Relevant CWE: CWE-916 Use of Password Hash With Insufficient Computational Effort
\n| CVSS Version | \nBase Score | \nBase Severity | \nVector String | \n
|---|---|---|---|
| 3.1 | \n5.4 | \nMEDIUM | \nCVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N | \n
| 4.0 | \n5.9 | \nMEDIUM | \nCVSS:4.0/AV:A/AC:H/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N | \n
The device includes default accounts with hard-coded credentials.
\n\nVendor fix
Danelec has released firmware version V5.250 to resolve these vulnerabilities. Users of MacGregor Voyage Data Recorder (VDR) G4e devices are encouraged to update the firmware at the earliest service attendance rather than waiting for an annual performance test. Contact Danelec with additional questions: https://www.danelec.com/contact
https://www.danelec.com/contact
Relevant CWE: CWE-798 Use of Hard-coded Credentials
\n| CVSS Version | \nBase Score | \nBase Severity | \nVector String | \n
|---|---|---|---|
| 3.1 | \n8.3 | \nHIGH | \nCVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L | \n
| 4.0 | \n8.7 | \nHIGH | \nCVSS:4.0/AV:A/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N | \n
The administrator account for the web interface can directly edit sensitive files related to authentication, potentially changing the root password.
\n\nVendor fix
Danelec has released firmware version V5.250 to resolve these vulnerabilities. Users of MacGregor Voyage Data Recorder (VDR) G4e devices are encouraged to update the firmware at the earliest service attendance rather than waiting for an annual performance test. Contact Danelec with additional questions: https://www.danelec.com/contact
https://www.danelec.com/contact
Relevant CWE: CWE-552 Files or Directories Accessible to External Parties
\n| CVSS Version | \nBase Score | \nBase Severity | \nVector String | \n
|---|---|---|---|
| 3.1 | \n5.7 | \nMEDIUM | \nCVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:L | \n
| 4.0 | \n6.9 | \nMEDIUM | \nCVSS:4.0/AV:A/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N | \n
This product is provided subject to this Notification (https://www.cisa.gov/notification) and this Privacy & Use policy (https://www.cisa.gov/privacy-policy).
\nCISA recommends users take defensive measures to minimize the risk of exploitation of these vulnerabilities.
\nMinimize network exposure for all control system devices and/or systems, ensuring they are not accessible from the internet.
\nLocate control system networks and remote devices behind firewalls and isolating them from business networks.
\nWhen remote access is required, use more secure methods, such as Virtual Private Networks (VPNs), recognizing VPNs may have vulnerabilities and should be updated to the most current version available. Also recognize VPN is only as secure as the connected devices.
\nCISA reminds organizations to perform proper impact analysis and risk assessment prior to deploying defensive measures.
\nCISA also provides a section for control systems security recommended practices on the ICS webpage on cisa.gov/ics. Several CISA products detailing cyber defense best practices are available for reading and download, including Improving Industrial Control Systems Cybersecurity with Defense-in-Depth Strategies.
\nCISA encourages organizations to implement recommended cybersecurity strategies for proactive defense of ICS assets.
\nAdditional mitigation guidance and recommended practices are publicly available on the ICS webpage at cisa.gov/ics in the technical information paper, ICS-TIP-12-146-01B--Targeted Cyber Intrusion Detection and Mitigation Strategies.
\nOrganizations observing suspected malicious activity should follow established internal procedures and report findings to CISA for tracking and correlation against other incidents.
\nNo known public exploitation specifically targeting these vulnerabilities has been reported to CISA at this time.
\n| Date | \nRevision | \nSummary | \n
|---|---|---|
| 2026-05-28 | \n1 | \nInitial Publication | \n
Successful exploitation of this vulnerability may grant full unauthorized access to camera feeds and settings.
\nThe following versions of KMW CCTV Security Cameras are affected:
\n| CVSS | \nVendor | \nEquipment | \nVulnerabilities | \n
|---|---|---|---|
| v3 9.1 | \nKMW | \nKMW CCTV Security Cameras | \nUnverified Password Change | \n
The affected product is vulnerable to a critical unauthenticated password reset. This flaw allows an attacker to remotely reset the administrator password to a known value without authentication, granting full access to the camera feeds and settings.
\n\nMitigation
KMW has issued a firmware update to address this vulnerability. The firmware update can be found at https://main.kmw.ro/pub/Firmware/521_421.zip.
https://main.kmw.ro/pub/Firmware/521_421.zip
Vendor fix
KM-IP421 - will lose the cloud authorization after this update so users will need to contact customer support to re-authorize the P2P connection.
Mitigation
KMW recommends connecting surveillance equipment on a separate network, allow only specific devices access to the internet, check for firmware updates regularly, and use cloud connections responsibly.
Mitigation
If there are any issues customers are encouraged to contact KMW directly.
Relevant CWE: CWE-620 Unverified Password Change
\n| CVSS Version | \nBase Score | \nBase Severity | \nVector String | \n
|---|---|---|---|
| 3.1 | \n9.1 | \nCRITICAL | \nCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N | \n
This product is provided subject to this Notification (https://www.cisa.gov/notification) and this Privacy & Use policy (https://www.cisa.gov/privacy-policy).
\nCISA recommends users take defensive measures to minimize the risk of exploitation of this vulnerability.
\nMinimize network exposure for all control system devices and/or systems, ensuring they are not accessible from the internet.
\nLocate control system networks and remote devices behind firewalls and isolating them from business networks.
\nWhen remote access is required, use more secure methods, such as Virtual Private Networks (VPNs), recognizing VPNs may have vulnerabilities and should be updated to the most current version available. Also recognize VPN is only as secure as the connected devices.
\nCISA reminds organizations to perform proper impact analysis and risk assessment prior to deploying defensive measures.
\nCISA also provides a section for control systems security recommended practices on the ICS webpage on cisa.gov/ics. Several CISA products detailing cyber defense best practices are available for reading and download, including Improving Industrial Control Systems Cybersecurity with Defense-in-Depth Strategies.
\nCISA encourages organizations to implement recommended cybersecurity strategies for proactive defense of ICS assets.
\nAdditional mitigation guidance and recommended practices are publicly available on the ICS webpage at cisa.gov/ics in the technical information paper, ICS-TIP-12-146-01B--Targeted Cyber Intrusion Detection and Mitigation Strategies.
\nOrganizations observing suspected malicious activity should follow established internal procedures and report findings to CISA for tracking and correlation against other incidents.
\nCISA also recommends users take the following measures to protect themselves from social engineering attacks:
\nDo not click web links or open attachments in unsolicited email messages.
\nRefer to Recognizing and Avoiding Email Scams for more information on avoiding email scams.
\nRefer to Avoiding Social Engineering and Phishing Attacks for more information on social engineering attacks.
\nNo known public exploitation specifically targeting this vulnerability has been reported to CISA at this time.
\n| Date | \nRevision | \nSummary | \n
|---|---|---|
| 2026-05-28 | \n1 | \nInitial Publication | \n
Successful exploitation of this vulnerability could result in an attacker gaining administrator access to the device.
\nThe following versions of Jinan USR IOT Technology Limited (PUSR) USR-W610 RS232/485 to Wi-Fi/Ethernet Converter are affected:
\n| CVSS | \nVendor | \nEquipment | \nVulnerabilities | \n
|---|---|---|---|
| v3 9.8 | \nJinan USR IOT Technology Limited (PUSR) | \nJinan USR IOT Technology Limited (PUSR) USR-W610 RS232/485 to Wi-Fi/Ethernet Converter | \nUse of Hard-coded Credentials | \n
The device firmware contains plaintext administrative credentials embedded in the firmware image. These credentials can be extracted through firmware analysis and used to authenticate to device services.
\n\nMitigation
Jinan USR IOT Technology Limited (PUSR) did not respond to CISA's attempts at coordination. Users of PUSR USR-W610 devices are encouraged to contact PUSR and keep their systems up to date.
Relevant CWE: CWE-798 Use of Hard-coded Credentials
\n| CVSS Version | \nBase Score | \nBase Severity | \nVector String | \n
|---|---|---|---|
| 3.1 | \n9.8 | \nCRITICAL | \nCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | \n
This product is provided subject to this Notification (https://www.cisa.gov/notification) and this Privacy & Use policy (https://www.cisa.gov/privacy-policy).
\nCISA recommends users take defensive measures to minimize the risk of exploitation of this vulnerability.
\nMinimize network exposure for all control system devices and/or systems, ensuring they are not accessible from the internet.
\nLocate control system networks and remote devices behind firewalls and isolating them from business networks.
\nWhen remote access is required, use more secure methods, such as Virtual Private Networks (VPNs), recognizing VPNs may have vulnerabilities and should be updated to the most current version available. Also recognize VPN is only as secure as the connected devices.
\nCISA reminds organizations to perform proper impact analysis and risk assessment prior to deploying defensive measures.
\nCISA also provides a section for control systems security recommended practices on the ICS webpage on cisa.gov/ics. Several CISA products detailing cyber defense best practices are available for reading and download, including Improving Industrial Control Systems Cybersecurity with Defense-in-Depth Strategies.
\nCISA encourages organizations to implement recommended cybersecurity strategies for proactive defense of ICS assets.
\nAdditional mitigation guidance and recommended practices are publicly available on the ICS webpage at cisa.gov/ics in the technical information paper, ICS-TIP-12-146-01B--Targeted Cyber Intrusion Detection and Mitigation Strategies.
\nOrganizations observing suspected malicious activity should follow established internal procedures and report findings to CISA for tracking and correlation against other incidents.
\nNo known public exploitation specifically targeting this vulnerability has been reported to CISA at this time.
\n| Date | \nRevision | \nSummary | \n
|---|---|---|
| 2026-05-28 | \n1 | \nInitial Publication | \n
ABB is aware of vulnerabilities in the product versions listed as affected in the advisory. An attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability could gain physical, unauthorized access to a Building where the product is installed
\nThe following versions of ABB Busch-Welcome 2 Wire Door Opener Actuator are affected:
\n| CVSS | \nVendor | \nEquipment | \nVulnerabilities | \n
|---|---|---|---|
| v3 6.8 | \nABB | \nABB Busch-Welcome 2 Wire Door Opener Actuator | \nActive Debug Code | \n
Authentication bypass due to compatibility mode enabled by default
\n\nMitigation
The following actions need to be executed on premise where the respective Busch-Welcome\u00ae System is installed: \u2022 While the Busch-Welcome\u00ae System is in operation, toggle the mode switch on the product from \u201cDoor-Open\u201d - to \u201cLight\u201d \u2013 Mode, wait one second and switch back to \u201cDoor-Open\u201d - Mode. \u2022 Restart the Busch-Welcome\u00ae System with a Power reset (mains power off and on again). By executing the above steps, the system will recalibrate itself during boot up and will correct the misconfiguration automatically. ABB recommends that customers apply the above listed actions at the earliest convenience.
Relevant CWE: CWE-489 Active Debug Code
\n| CVSS Version | \nBase Score | \nBase Severity | \nVector String | \n
|---|---|---|---|
| 3.1 | \n6.8 | \nMEDIUM | \nCVSS:3.1/AV:P/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | \n
The information in this document is subject to change without notice, and should not be construed as a commitment by ABB. ABB provides no warranty, express or implied, including warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose, for the information contained in this document, and assumes no responsibility for any errors that may appear in this document. In no event shall ABB or any of its suppliers be liable for direct, indirect, special, incidental or consequential damages of any nature or kind arising from the use of this document, or from the use of any hard-ware or software described in this document, even if ABB or its suppliers have been advised of the possibility of such damages. This document and parts hereof must not be reproduced or copied without written permission from ABB, and the contents hereof must not be imparted to a third party nor used for any unauthorized purpose. All rights to registrations and trademarks reside with their respective owners.
\nABB recommends double check the system handbook of a Busch-Welcome\u00ae two wire system regarding security advises for the correct installation.
\nThis product is provided subject to this Notification (https://www.cisa.gov/notification) and this Privacy & Use policy (https://www.cisa.gov/privacy-policy).
\nCISA recommends users take defensive measures to minimize the exploitation risk of these vulnerabilities.
\nMinimize network exposure for all control system devices and/or systems, and ensure they are not accessible from the internet.
\nLocate control system networks and remote devices behind firewalls and isolate them from business networks.
\nWhen remote access is required, use more secure methods, such as Virtual Private Networks (VPNs), recognizing VPNs may have vulnerabilities and should be updated to the most recent version available. Also recognize VPN is only as secure as its connected devices.
\nCISA reminds organizations to perform proper impact analysis and risk assessment prior to deploying defensive measures.
\nCISA also provides a section for control systems security recommended practices on the ICS webpage on cisa.gov. Several CISA products detailing cyber defense best practices are available for reading and download, including Improving Industrial Control Systems Cybersecurity with Defense-in-Depth Strategies.
\nCISA encourages organizations to implement recommended cybersecurity strategies for proactive defense of ICS assets. Additional mitigation guidance and recommended practices are publicly available on the ICS webpage at cisa.gov in the technical information paper, ICS-TIP-12-146-01B--Targeted Cyber Intrusion Detection and Mitigation Strategies.
\nOrganizations observing suspected malicious activity should follow established internal procedures and report findings to CISA for tracking and correlation against other incidents.
\nThis ICSA is a verbatim republication of ABB PSIRT 9AKK108471A4556 from a direct conversion of the vendor's Common Security Advisory Framework (CSAF) advisory. This is republished to CISA's website as a means of increasing visibility and is provided \"as-is\" for informational purposes only. CISA is not responsible for the editorial or technical accuracy of republished advisories and provides no warranties of any kind regarding any information contained within this advisory. Further, CISA does not endorse any commercial product or service. Please contact ABB PSIRT directly for any questions regarding this advisory.
\n| Date | \nRevision | \nSummary | \n
|---|---|---|
| 2025-07-21 | \n1 | \nInitial version. | \n
| 2026-05-28 | \n2 | \nInitial CISA Republication of ABB PSIRT 9AKK108471A4556 advisory | \n
CISA is prioritizing the response to multiple emerging software supply chain intrusion campaigns targeting developer ecosystems Continuous Integration/Continuous Development (CI/CD) pipelines. These recent incidents, including the GitHub compromise via a malicious Nx Console Visual Studio Code (VS Code) extension and the \u201cMegalodon\u201d supply chain intrusion campaign, demonstrate how cyber threat actors are abusing tools and processes that support enterprise, cloud, and DevOps environments\u2014specifically CI/CD pipelines, code extensions and workflows.
\nThreat actors leveraged a prior compromise of Nx developer systems to compromise a GitHub employee\u2019s device through a poisoned third-party VS Code extension, resulting in unauthorized access and exfiltration of internal GitHub repositories. The malicious extension version (18.95.0) was distributed through VS Code\u2019s automatic update mechanism, meaning systems with Nx Console previously installed may have received the malicious build without developers taking any manual installation action. GitHub released a security advisory on this activity, and CVE-2026-48027 has been assigned to the malicious version of Nx Console and added to CISA\u2019s Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) Catalog.
\nAdditionally, in a campaign known as \u201cMegalodon,\u201d a cyber threat actor injected malicious GitHub Action workflows to harvest CI/CD secrets, cloud credentials, and tokens, impacting both development and deployment pipelines in public GitHub repositories.
\nCISA urges organizations to implement the following recommendations to detect and remediate a potential compromise:
\nbuild-bot, auto-ci, ci-bot, pipeline-bot and especially those made after May 18, 2026.If your organization discovers a compromise resulting from previously compromised GitHub or Nx Console software, CISA recommends the following steps:
\nCISA recommends the following best practices for using package repos:
\nSee the following resources for additional guidance on these compromises:
\nThe information in this report is being provided \u201cas is\u201d for informational purposes only. CISA does not endorse any commercial entity, product, company, or service, including any entities, products, or services linked within this document. Any reference to specific commercial entities, products, processes, or services by service mark, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not constitute or imply endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by CISA.\u202f
", "summary_is_html": true, "first_seen": "Thu, 28 May 26 12:00:00 +0000", "last_updated": "Thu, 28 May 26 12:00:00 +0000" }, { "id": "https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/ics-advisories/icsa-26-148-05", "title": "CP Plus 8 Ch. Network Video Recorder", "source": "CISA Cybersecurity Advisory", "source_url": "https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/ics-advisories/icsa-26-148-05", "summary": "\nSuccessful exploitation of this vulnerability allows an attacker's malicious script to execute in the browser of any authenticated user or administrator who accesses the affected interface. This could lead to compromise of user sessions, execution of unauthorized actions with the victim's privileges, exposure or manipulation of sensitive data, and degradation of overall system integrity.
\nThe following versions of CP Plus 8 Ch. Network Video Recorder are affected:
\n| CVSS | \nVendor | \nEquipment | \nVulnerabilities | \n
|---|---|---|---|
| v3 8.4 | \nCP Plus | \nCP Plus 8 Ch. Network Video Recorder | \nImproper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting') | \n
A stored Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability exists in certain 1xxx series NVR devices due to insufficient sanitization of user-supplied input in specific functional modules. Attackers can inject malicious scripts, which are then persistently stored on the device backend. When administrators or users access affected pages, the stored scripts are executed in their browsers, leading to potential session hijacking, unauthorized actions, or data theft.
\n\nMitigation
CP Plus recommends updating the firmware on the device to the latest firmware version.
Mitigation
CP-UNR-AxxxMars_PN_15_Q_00_V1.00.14.01.T.260326 which can be downloaded at https://drive.google.com/file/d/1Ctxdp55UtlrQY7CSepkImM9zFgdcuCyL/view
https://drive.google.com/file/d/1Ctxdp55UtlrQY7CSepkImM9zFgdcuCyL/view
Mitigation
For firmware access and upgrade instructions, please contact support at:
Mitigation
Phone: +91-8800952952
Mitigation
Email: support@cpplusworld.com
mailto:support@cpplusworld.com
Relevant CWE: CWE-79 Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting')
\n| CVSS Version | \nBase Score | \nBase Severity | \nVector String | \n
|---|---|---|---|
| 3.1 | \n8.4 | \nHIGH | \nCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H | \n
This product is provided subject to this Notification (https://www.cisa.gov/notification) and this Privacy & Use policy (https://www.cisa.gov/privacy-policy).
\nCISA recommends users take defensive measures to minimize the risk of exploitation of this vulnerability.
\nMinimize network exposure for all control system devices and/or systems, ensuring they are not accessible from the internet.
\nLocate control system networks and remote devices behind firewalls and isolating them from business networks.
\nWhen remote access is required, use more secure methods, such as Virtual Private Networks (VPNs), recognizing VPNs may have vulnerabilities and should be updated to the most current version available. Also recognize VPN is only as secure as the connected devices.
\nCISA reminds organizations to perform proper impact analysis and risk assessment prior to deploying defensive measures.
\nCISA also provides a section for control systems security recommended practices on the ICS webpage on cisa.gov/ics. Several CISA products detailing cyber defense best practices are available for reading and download, including Improving Industrial Control Systems Cybersecurity with Defense-in-Depth Strategies.
\nCISA encourages organizations to implement recommended cybersecurity strategies for proactive defense of ICS assets.
\nAdditional mitigation guidance and recommended practices are publicly available on the ICS webpage at cisa.gov/ics in the technical information paper, ICS-TIP-12-146-01B--Targeted Cyber Intrusion Detection and Mitigation Strategies.
\nOrganizations observing suspected malicious activity should follow established internal procedures and report findings to CISA for tracking and correlation against other incidents.
\nCISA also recommends users take the following measures to protect themselves from social engineering attacks:
\nDo not click web links or open attachments in unsolicited email messages.
\nRefer to Recognizing and Avoiding Email Scams for more information on avoiding email scams.
\nRefer to Avoiding Social Engineering and Phishing Attacks for more information on social engineering attacks.
\nNo known public exploitation specifically targeting this vulnerability has been reported to CISA at this time.
\n| Date | \nRevision | \nSummary | \n
|---|---|---|
| 2026-05-28 | \n1 | \nInitial Publication | \n
Successful exploitation of this vulnerability could allow an attacker to read and write arbitrary handle values and change clinical readings, which could result in taking control of the device and lead to patient harm.
\nThe following versions of Fourth Frontier Frontier X Mobile Application, Frontier X2 are affected:
\n| CVSS | \nVendor | \nEquipment | \nVulnerabilities | \n
|---|---|---|---|
| v3 8.8 | \nFourth Frontier | \nFourth Frontier Frontier X Mobile Application, Frontier X2 | \nMissing Authentication for Critical Function | \n
The Frontier X2 device allows unauthenticated BLE read/write access to critical GATT characteristics without enforcing pairing authentication or authorization. This allows attackers within BLE range to perform unauthorized control of device functions, including starting/stopping activities, triggering vibrations, causing denial-of-service conditions, and fuzzing characteristic values to induce unexpected behavior. Additionally, the Frontier X mobile application lacks proper BLE device authentication, allowing attackers to impersonate a legitimate Frontier X2 device and connect to the application. By cloning BLE advertisements and exposing expected GATT characteristics, attackers can manipulate activity states and inject fabricated health telemetry such as breathing rate, heart rate, strain, and other health-related data into the mobile application.
\n\nMitigation
Fourth Frontier is aware of the vulnerability and is working on a fix. Users are encouraged to reach out to Fourth Frontier directly for assistance. https://fourthfrontier.com/pages/contact-usl.
https://fourthfrontier.com/pages/contact-us
Mitigation
Frontier X/X2 devices can connect to only one app at a time; users should first connect the Frontier X/X2 device using the Frontier X app and then start the activity.
Relevant CWE: CWE-306 Missing Authentication for Critical Function
\n| CVSS Version | \nBase Score | \nBase Severity | \nVector String | \n
|---|---|---|---|
| 3.1 | \n8.8 | \nHIGH | \nCVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | \n
This product is provided subject to this Notification (https://www.cisa.gov/notification) and this Privacy & Use policy (https://www.cisa.gov/privacy-policy).
\nCISA recommends users take defensive measures to minimize the risk of exploitation of this vulnerability.
\nMinimize network exposure for all control system devices and/or systems, ensuring they are not accessible from the internet.
\nLocate control system networks and remote devices behind firewalls and isolating them from business networks.
\nWhen remote access is required, use more secure methods, such as Virtual Private Networks (VPNs), recognizing VPNs may have vulnerabilities and should be updated to the most current version available. Also recognize VPN is only as secure as the connected devices.
\nCISA reminds organizations to perform proper impact analysis and risk assessment prior to deploying defensive measures.
\nCISA also provides a section for control systems security recommended practices on the ICS webpage on cisa.gov/ics. Several CISA products detailing cyber defense best practices are available for reading and download, including Improving Industrial Control Systems Cybersecurity with Defense-in-Depth Strategies.
\nCISA encourages organizations to implement recommended cybersecurity strategies for proactive defense of ICS assets.
\nAdditional mitigation guidance and recommended practices are publicly available on the ICS webpage at cisa.gov/ics in the technical information paper, ICS-TIP-12-146-01B--Targeted Cyber Intrusion Detection and Mitigation Strategies.
\nOrganizations observing suspected malicious activity should follow established internal procedures and report findings to CISA for tracking and correlation against other incidents.
\nNo known public exploitation specifically targeting this vulnerability has been reported to CISA at this time. This vulnerability is not exploitable remotely.
\n| Date | \nRevision | \nSummary | \n
|---|---|---|
| 2026-05-28 | \n1 | \nInitial Publication | \n
Schneider Electric is aware of a vulnerability in its EcostruxureTM Machine Expert HVAC product. The [EcostruxureTM Machine Expert HVAC](https://www.se.com/ww/en/download/document/EcoStruxureME_HVAC/) product is a programming software for Modicon M171-M172 logic controllers. Failure to apply the remediation provided below may risk in revealing sensitive information, which could result in disclosing protected source code, leading to loss of confidentiality.
\nThe following versions of Schneider Electric EcoStruxure Machine Expert HVAC (SEVD-2026-132-01) are affected:
\n| CVSS | \nVendor | \nEquipment | \nVulnerabilities | \n
|---|---|---|---|
| v3 5.5 | \nSchneider Electric | \nSchneider Electric EcoStruxure Machine Expert HVAC (SEVD-2026-132-01) | \nCleartext Storage of Sensitive Information | \n
CWE-312: Cleartext Storage of Sensitive Information vulnerability exists that could cause the disclosure of a sensitive information which could result in revealing protected source code and loss of confidentiality, when an authorized attacker accesses the source code for editing or compiling it.
\n\nVendor fix
Version 1.10.0 of Ecostruxure\u2122 Machine Expert HVAC includes a fix for this vulnerability and is available for download here: https://www.se.com/ww/en/download/document/EcoStruxureME_HVAC_1_10_0/
https://www.se.com/ww/en/download/document/EcoStruxureME_HVAC_1_10_0/
Relevant CWE: CWE-312 Cleartext Storage of Sensitive Information
\n| CVSS Version | \nBase Score | \nBase Severity | \nVector String | \n
|---|---|---|---|
| 3.1 | \n5.5 | \nMEDIUM | \nCVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N | \n
We strongly recommend the following industry cybersecurity best practices. * Locate control and safety system networks and remote devices behind firewalls and isolate them from the business network. * Install physical controls so no unauthorized personnel can access your industrial control and safety systems, components, peripheral equipment, and networks. * Place all controllers in locked cabinets and never leave them in the \u201cProgram\u201d mode. * Never connect programming software to any network other than the network intended for that device. * Scan all methods of mobile data exchange with the isolated network such as CDs, USB drives, etc. before use in the terminals or any node connected to these networks. * Never allow mobile devices that have connected to any other network besides the intended network to connect to the safety or control networks without proper sanitation. * Minimize network exposure for all control system devices and systems and ensure that they are not accessible from the Internet. * When remote access is required, use secure methods, such as Virtual Private Networks (VPNs). Recognize that VPNs may have vulnerabilities and should be updated to the most current version available. Also, understand that VPNs are only as secure as the connected devices. For more information refer to the Schneider Electric [Recommended Cybersecurity Best Practices](https://www.se.com/us/en/download/document/7EN52-0390/) document.
\nThis document provides an overview of the identified vulnerability or vulnerabilities and actions required to mitigate. For more details and assistance on how to protect your installation, contact your local Schneider Electric representative or Schneider Electric Industrial Cybersecurity Services: https://www.se.com/ww/en/work/solutions/cybersecurity/. These organizations will be fully aware of this situation and can support you through the process. For further information related to cybersecurity in Schneider Electric's products, visit the company's cybersecurity support portal page: https://www.se.com/ww/en/work/support/cybersecurity/overview.jsp
\nTHIS NOTIFICATION DOCUMENT, THE INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN, AND ANY MATERIALS LINKED FROM IT (COLLECTIVELY, THIS \u201cNOTIFICATION\u201d) ARE INTENDED TO HELP PROVIDE AN OVERVIEW OF THE IDENTIFIED SITUATION AND SUGGESTED MITIGATION ACTIONS, REMEDIATION, FIX, AND/OR GENERAL SECURITY RECOMMENDATIONS AND IS PROVIDED ON AN \u201cAS-IS\u201d BASIS WITHOUT WARRANTY OR GUARANTEE OF ANY KIND. SCHNEIDER ELECTRIC DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES RELATING TO THIS NOTIFICATION, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. SCHNEIDER ELECTRIC MAKES NO WARRANTY THAT THE NOTIFICATION WILL RESOLVE THE IDENTIFIED SITUATION. IN NO EVENT SHALL SCHNEIDER ELECTRIC BE LIABLE FOR ANY DAMAGES OR LOSSES WHATSOEVER IN CONNECTION WITH THIS NOTIFICATION, INCLUDING DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, CONSEQUENTIAL, LOSS OF BUSINESS PROFITS OR SPECIAL DAMAGES, EVEN IF SCHNEIDER ELECTRIC HAS BEEN ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGES. YOUR USE OF THIS NOTIFICATION IS AT YOUR OWN RISK, AND YOU ARE SOLELY LIABLE FOR ANY DAMAGES TO YOUR SYSTEMS OR ASSETS OR OTHER LOSSES THAT MAY RESULT FROM YOUR USE OF THIS NOTIFICATION. SCHNEIDER ELECTRIC RESERVES THE RIGHT TO UPDATE OR CHANGE THIS NOTIFICATION AT ANY TIME AND IN ITS SOLE DISCRETION
\nSchneider's purpose is to create Impact by empowering all to make the most of our energy and resources, bridging progress and sustainability for all. We call this Life Is On. Our mission is to be the trusted partner in Sustainability and Efficiency. We are a global industrial technology leader bringing world-leading expertise in electrification, automation and digitization to smart industries, resilient infrastructure, future-proof data centers, intelligent buildings, and intuitive homes. Anchored by our deep domain expertise, we provide integrated end-to-end lifecycle AI enabled Industrial IoT solutions with connected products, automation, software and services, delivering digital twins to enable profitable growth for our customers. We are a people company with an ecosystem of 150,000 colleagues and more than a million partners operating in over 100 countries to ensure proximity to our customers and stakeholders. We embrace diversity and inclusion in everything we do, guided by our meaningful purpose of a sustainable future for all. www.se.com
\nThis product is provided subject to this Notification (https://www.cisa.gov/notification) and this Privacy & Use policy (https://www.cisa.gov/privacy-policy).
\nCISA recommends users take defensive measures to minimize the exploitation risk of these vulnerabilities.
\nMinimize network exposure for all control system devices and/or systems, and ensure they are not accessible from the internet.
\nLocate control system networks and remote devices behind firewalls and isolate them from business networks.
\nWhen remote access is required, use more secure methods, such as Virtual Private Networks (VPNs), recognizing VPNs may have vulnerabilities and should be updated to the most recent version available. Also recognize VPN is only as secure as its connected devices.
\nCISA reminds organizations to perform proper impact analysis and risk assessment prior to deploying defensive measures.
\nCISA also provides a section for control systems security recommended practices on the ICS webpage on cisa.gov. Several CISA products detailing cyber defense best practices are available for reading and download, including Improving Industrial Control Systems Cybersecurity with Defense-in-Depth Strategies.
\nCISA encourages organizations to implement recommended cybersecurity strategies for proactive defense of ICS assets. Additional mitigation guidance and recommended practices are publicly available on the ICS webpage at cisa.gov in the technical information paper, ICS-TIP-12-146-01B--Targeted Cyber Intrusion Detection and Mitigation Strategies.
\nOrganizations observing suspected malicious activity should follow established internal procedures and report findings to CISA for tracking and correlation against other incidents.
\nThis ICSA is a verbatim republication of Schneider Electric CPCERT SEVD-2026-132-01 from a direct conversion of the vendor's Common Security Advisory Framework (CSAF) advisory. This is republished to CISA's website as a means of increasing visibility and is provided \"as-is\" for informational purposes only. CISA is not responsible for the editorial or technical accuracy of republished advisories and provides no warranties of any kind regarding any information contained within this advisory. Further, CISA does not endorse any commercial product or service. Please contact Schneider Electric CPCERT directly for any questions regarding this advisory.
\n| Date | \nRevision | \nSummary | \n
|---|---|---|
| 2026-05-12 | \n1 | \nOriginal Release | \n
| 2026-05-28 | \n2 | \nInitial CISA Republication of Schneider Electric CPCERT SEVD-2026-132-01 advisory | \n